<james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx>,linux-ext4@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-f2fs-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-mtd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,jfs-discussion@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,ocfs2-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-unionfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,reiserfs-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-security-module@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,selinux@xxxxxxxxxxxxx,linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx From: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <99179B10-4EAE-4FAB-9D14-B885156261B3@xxxxxxxxxx> On October 21, 2017 6:03:02 PM GMT+02:00, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >Quoting Nicolas Belouin (nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx): >> with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to >> flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted >> xattr is near zero. >> CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as >> entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It >> would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. > >You say "for example". Are you intending to add more uses? If so, >what >are they? If not, how about renaming it CAP_TRUSTED_XATTR? > I don't see any other use for now, but I don't want it to be too narrow and non usable in a similar context in the future. So I believe the underlying purpose of marking a process as "trusted" (even if for now it only means rw permission on trusted xattr) is more meaningful. >What all does allowing writes to trusted xattrs give you? There are >the overlayfs whiteouts, what else? Nicolas -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
