On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 02:03:23PM +1300, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>
> > Now a shared group can be only inherited from a source mount.
> > This patch adds an ability to add a mount into an existing shared
> > group.
>
> This sounds like a lot of the discussion on bind mounts accross
> namespaces. I am going to stay out of this for a bit until
> we resolve my latest patch.
Hi Eric,
Your patches about shadow/side mounts were committed, can we resume
the discussion about this patch?
As for security, a mount can be added to a shared group, only if a
caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in namespaces of both mounts, so an
unprivileged user can't create a shared mount with a parent mount
namespace. If a user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, I don't see a reason to
restrict him to create shared mounts between namespaces, even if they
are in different user-namespaces.
Now I look at volume drivers in container services (like docker and
kubernetes) and I think this functionality can be useful for them too.
Now it is impossible to run a plugin driver in unprivileged containers
(with sub-userns), because a container has to have a shared mount with
a mount namespace where the service is running. The idea of these
plugins is that a service requests a volume mount from a plugin and
then starts a container with this volume, so the service need to have
a way to get a mount from a service.
>
> Eric
On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 10:18 PM, Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Now a shared group can be only inherited from a source mount.
> This patch adds an ability to add a mount into an existing shared
> group.
>
> mount(source, target, NULL, MS_SET_GROUP, NULL)
>
> mount() with the MS_SET_GROUP flag adds the "target" mount into a group
> of the "source" mount. The calling process has to have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> capability in namespaces of these mounts. The source and the target
> mounts have to have the same super block.
>
> This new functionality together with "mnt: Tuck mounts under others
> instead of creating shadow/side mounts." allows CRIU to dump and restore
> any set of mount namespaces.
>
> Currently we have a lot of issues about dumping and restoring mount
> namespaces. The bigest problem is that we can't construct mount trees
> directly due to several reasons:
> * groups can't be set, they can be only inherited
> * file systems has to be mounted from the specified user namespaces
> * the mount() syscall doesn't just create one mount -- the mount is
> also propagated to all members of a parent group
> * umount() doesn't detach mounts from all members of a group
> (mounts with children are not umounted)
> * mounts are propagated underneath of existing mounts
> * mount() doesn't allow to make bind-mounts between two namespaces
> * processes can have opened file descriptors to overmounted files
>
> All these operations are non-trivial, making the task of restoring
> a mount namespace practically unsolvable for reasonable time. The
> proposed change allows to restore a mount namespace in a direct
> manner, without any super complex logic.
>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/namespace.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> include/uapi/linux/fs.h | 6 +++++
> 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index cc1375ef..3bf0cd2 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -2355,6 +2355,57 @@ static inline int tree_contains_unbindable(struct mount *mnt)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static int do_set_group(struct path *path, const char *sibling_name)
> +{
> + struct mount *sibling, *mnt;
> + struct path sibling_path;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!sibling_name || !*sibling_name)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + err = kern_path(sibling_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &sibling_path);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + sibling = real_mount(sibling_path.mnt);
> + mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
> +
> + namespace_lock();
> +
> + err = -EPERM;
> + if (!sibling->mnt_ns ||
> + !ns_capable(sibling->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + if (sibling->mnt.mnt_sb != mnt->mnt.mnt_sb)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> + if (IS_MNT_SHARED(mnt) || IS_MNT_SLAVE(mnt))
> + goto out_unlock;
> +
> + if (IS_MNT_SLAVE(sibling)) {
> + struct mount *m = sibling->mnt_master;
> +
> + list_add(&mnt->mnt_slave, &m->mnt_slave_list);
> + mnt->mnt_master = m;
> + }
> +
> + if (IS_MNT_SHARED(sibling)) {
> + mnt->mnt_group_id = sibling->mnt_group_id;
> + list_add(&mnt->mnt_share, &sibling->mnt_share);
> + set_mnt_shared(mnt);
> + }
> +
> + err = 0;
> +out_unlock:
> + namespace_unlock();
> +
> + path_put(&sibling_path);
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
> {
> struct path old_path, parent_path;
> @@ -2769,6 +2820,7 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
> struct path path;
> int retval = 0;
> int mnt_flags = 0;
> + unsigned long cmd;
>
> /* Discard magic */
> if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
> @@ -2820,19 +2872,25 @@ long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
> mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
> }
>
> + cmd = flags & (MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
> + MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE |
> + MS_MOVE | MS_SET_GROUP);
> +
> flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
> MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
> MS_STRICTATIME | MS_NOREMOTELOCK | MS_SUBMOUNT);
>
> - if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
> + if (cmd & MS_REMOUNT)
> retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
> data_page);
> - else if (flags & MS_BIND)
> + else if (cmd & MS_BIND)
> retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
> - else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
> + else if (cmd & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
> retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
> - else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
> + else if (cmd & MS_MOVE)
> retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
> + else if (cmd & MS_SET_GROUP)
> + retval = do_set_group(&path, dev_name);
> else
> retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
> dev_name, data_page);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
> index 048a85e..33423aa 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/fs.h
> @@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {
> #define MS_STRICTATIME (1<<24) /* Always perform atime updates */
> #define MS_LAZYTIME (1<<25) /* Update the on-disk [acm]times lazily */
>
> +/*
> + * Here are commands and flags. Commands are handled in do_mount()
> + * and can intersect with kernel internal flags.
> + */
> +#define MS_SET_GROUP (1<<26) /* Add a mount into a shared group */
> +
> /* These sb flags are internal to the kernel */
> #define MS_SUBMOUNT (1<<26)
> #define MS_NOREMOTELOCK (1<<27)
> --
> 2.9.3
>
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