* Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > And yes, I realize that there were other such bugs and that such bugs might > > occur in the future - but why not push the overhead of the security check to > > the kernel build phase? I.e. I'm wondering how well we could do static > > analysis during kernel build - would a limited mode of Sparse be good enough > > for that? Or we could add a new static checker to tools/, built from first > > principles and used primarily for extended syntactical checking. > > Static analysis is just not going to cover all cases. We've had vulnerabilities > where interrupt handlers left KERNEL_DS set, for example. [...] Got any commit ID of that bug - was it because a function executed by the interrupt handler leaked KERNEL_DS? > [...] If there are performance concerns, let's put this behind a CONFIG. 2-5 > instructions is not an issue for most people that want this coverage. That doesn't really _solve_ the performance concerns, it just forces most people to enable it by creating a 'security or performance' false dichotomy ... > [...] and it still won't catch everything. Bug-finding is different from making > a bug class just unexploitable at all. As we've done before, it's the difference > between trying to find format string attacks vs just removing %n from the format > parser. No, it does not make it unexploitable, it could still be exploitable if the runtime check is buggy or if there's kernel execution outside of the regular system call paths - there's plenty of such hardware functionality on x86 for example. Thanks, Ingo -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html