On 04/04/17 10:47, Thomas Garnier wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> index 516593e66bd6..12fa851c7fa8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64_types.h
> @@ -78,4 +78,15 @@ typedef struct { pteval_t pte; } pte_t;
>
> #define EARLY_DYNAMIC_PAGE_TABLES 64
>
> +/*
> + * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page. The guard
> + * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
> + * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
> + * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
> + * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. We avoid this
> + * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
> + * at the maximum canonical address.
> + */
> +#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((_AC(1, UL) << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_PGTABLE_64_DEFS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index 3cada998a402..e80822582d3e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -825,17 +825,6 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
> #define KSTK_ESP(task) (task_pt_regs(task)->sp)
>
> #else
> -/*
> - * User space process size. 47bits minus one guard page. The guard
> - * page is necessary on Intel CPUs: if a SYSCALL instruction is at
> - * the highest possible canonical userspace address, then that
> - * syscall will enter the kernel with a non-canonical return
> - * address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. We avoid this
> - * particular problem by preventing anything from being mapped
> - * at the maximum canonical address.
> - */
> -#define TASK_SIZE_MAX ((1UL << 47) - PAGE_SIZE)
> -
> /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
> * space during mmap's.
> */
>
This should be an entirely separate patch; if nothing else you need to
explain it in the comments.
Also, you say this is for "x86", but I still don't see any code for i386
whatsoever. Have you verified *all* the i386 and i386-compat paths to
make sure they go via prepare_exit_to_usermode()? [Cc: Andy]
Finally, I can't really believe I'm the only person for whom "Specific
usage of verity_pre_usermode_state" is completely opaque.
-hpa
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
