Re: [PATCH RFC v2 00/12] socket sendmsg MSG_ZEROCOPY

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On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 7:28 PM, David Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 13:06:49 -0800
>
>> On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Willem de Bruijn
>> <willemdebruijn.kernel@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 2:46 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Michael Kerrisk
>>>> <mtk.manpages@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>> [CC += linux-api@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Willem
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>> On a send call with MSG_ZEROCOPY, the kernel pins the user pages and
>>>>>> creates skbuff fragments directly from these pages. On tx completion,
>>>>>> it notifies the socket owner that it is safe to modify memory by
>>>>>> queuing a completion notification onto the socket error queue.
>>>>
>>>> What happens if the user writes to the pages while it's not safe?
>>>>
>>>> How about if you're writing to an interface or a route that has crypto
>>>> involved and a malicious user can make the data change in the middle
>>>> of a crypto operation, thus perhaps leaking the entire key?  (I
>>>> wouldn't be at all surprised if a lot of provably secure AEAD
>>>> constructions are entirely compromised if an attacker can get the
>>>> ciphertext and tag computed from a message that changed during the
>>>> computation.
>>>
>>> Operations that read or write payload, such as this crypto example,
>>> but also ebpf in tc or iptables, for instance, demand a deep copy using
>>> skb_copy_ubufs before the operation.
>>>
>>> This blacklist approach requires caution, but these paths should be
>>> few and countable. It is not possible to predict at the socket layer
>>> whether a packet will encounter any such operation, so white-listing
>>> a subset of end-to-end paths is not practical.
>>
>> How about hardware that malfunctions if the packet changes out from
>> under it?  A whitelist seems quite a bit safer.
>
> These device are already choking, because as I stated this can already
> be done via sendfile().
>
> Networking card wise this isn't an issue, chips bring the entire packet
> into their FIFO, compute checksums on the fly mid-stream, and then write
> the 16-bit checksum field before starting to write the packet onto the
> wire.
>
> I think this is completely a non-issue, and we thought about this right
> from the start when sendfile() support was added nearly two decades ago.
> If network cards from back then didn't crap out in this situation I
> think the ones out there now are probably ok.

Fair enough.
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