Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1 00/17] seccomp-object: From attack surface reduction to sandboxing

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On Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 4:24 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 23, 2016 at 6:46 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This series is a proof of concept (not ready for production) to extend seccomp
>> with the ability to check argument pointers of syscalls as kernel object (e.g.
>> file path). This add a needed feature to create a full sandbox managed by
>> userland like the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the OpenBSD Pledge. It was initially
>> inspired from a partial seccomp-LSM prototype [1] but has evolved a lot since :)
>
> This is interesting! I'd really like to get argument inspection
> working. I'm going to spend some time examining this series more
> closely, but my initial reaction is that I'm suspicious of the ToCToU
> checking -- I'd rather there be no race at all. As for the bug-fixes,
> I'll get those pulled in now. Thanks!
>

Personally, I love the OpenBSD pledge() mechanism. It makes it so easy
to apply attack surface reduction. If seccomp moves closer to pledge,
that would be great.

See here:
https://github.com/dimkr/libwaive
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