"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> A common way for daemons to run with minimal privilege is to start as root,
> perhaps setuid-root, choose a desired capability set, set PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,
> then change uid to non-root. A simpler way to achieve this is to set file
> capabilities on a not-setuid-root binary. However, when installing a package
> inside a (user-namespaced) container, packages cannot be installed with file
> capabilities. For this reason, containers must install ping setuid-root.
Don't ping sockets avoid that specific problem?
I expect the general case still holds.
> To achieve this, we would need for containers to be able to request file
> capabilities be added to a file without causing these to be honored in the
> initial user namespace.
>
> To this end, the patch below introduces a new capability xattr format. The
> main enhancement over the existing security.capability xattr is that we
> tag capability sets with a uid - the uid of the root user in the namespace
> where the capabilities are set. The capabilities will be ignored in any
> other namespace. The special case of uid == -1 (which must only ever be
> able to be set by kuid 0) means use the capabilities in all
> namespaces.
A quick comment on this.
We currently allow capabilities that have been gained to be valid in all
descendent user namespaces.
Applying this principle to the on-disk capabilities would make it so
that uid 0 would mean capabilities in all namespaces.
It might be worth it to introduce a fixed sized array with a length
parameter of perhaps 32 entries which is a path of root uids as seen by
the initial user namespace. That way the entire construction of the
user namespace could be verified. AKA verify the current user namespace
and the parent and the parents parent. Up to the user namespace the
current filesystem is mounted in. We would look at how much space
allows an xattr to be stored without causing filesystems a challenge
to properly size such an array.
Given that uids are fundamentally flat that might not be particularly
useful. If we add an alternative way of identifying user namespaces
say a privileged operation that set a uuid, then the complete path would
be more interesting.
> An alternative format would use a pair of uids to indicate a range of rootids.
> This would allow root in a user namespace with uids 100000-165536 mapped to
> set the xattr once on a file, then launch nested containers wherein the file
> could be used with privilege. That's not what this patch does, but would be
> a trivial change if people think it would be worthwhile.
>
> This patch does not actually address the real problem, which is setting the
> xattrs from inside containers. For that, I think the best solution is to
> add a pair of new system calls, setfcap and getfcap. Userspace would for
> instance call fsetfcap(fd, cap_user_header_t, cap_user_data_t), to which
> the kernel would, if not in init_user_ns, react by writing an appropriate
> security.nscapability xattr.
That feels hard to maintain, but you may be correct that we have a small
enough userspace that it would not be a problem.
Eric
> The libcap2 library's cap_set_file/cap_get_file could be switched over
> transparently to use this to hide its use from all callers.
>
> Comments appreciated.
>
> Note - In this patch, file capabilities only work for containers which have
> a root uid defined. We may want to allow -1 uids to work in all
> namespaces. There certainly would be uses for this, but I'm a bit unsettled
> about the implications of allowing a program privilege in a container where
> there is no uid with privilege. This needs more thought.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 15 +++++
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 47 ++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 3 +
> security/commoncap.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 4 files changed, 194 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index af9f0b9..24ac18e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
>
> #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
> +#include <linux/uidgid.h>
>
>
> #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
> @@ -31,6 +32,20 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
> kernel_cap_t inheritable;
> };
>
> +struct cpu_vfs_ns_cap_data {
> + __u32 flags;
> + kuid_t rootid;
> + kernel_cap_t permitted;
> + kernel_cap_t inheritable;
> +};
> +
> +struct cpu_vfs_ns_cap_header {
> + __u32 hdr_info;
> + struct cpu_vfs_ns_cap_data caps[0];
> +};
> +#define NS_CAPS_VERSION(x) (x & 0xFF)
> +#define NS_CAPS_NCAPS(x) ( (x >> 8) & 0xFF )
> +
> #define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct __user_cap_header_struct))
> #define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 12c37a1..2211a33 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -62,10 +62,14 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
> #define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
> #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
>
> +/* version number for security.nscapability xattrs hdr->hdr_info */
> +#define VFS_NS_CAP_REVISION 1
> +
> #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
> #define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
> #define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
>
> +
> struct vfs_cap_data {
> __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
> struct {
> @@ -74,6 +78,49 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
> } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> };
>
> +/*
> + * Q: do we want version in the header, or in the data?
> + * If it is in the header, then a container will need to
> + * make sure it is writing the same data.
> + *
> + * Actually, perhaps we simply do not support writing the
> + * xattr, we just use a new system call to get/set the fscap.
> + * The kernel can be in charge of watching the version numbers.
> + * After all, we can't allow the container to override the
> + * fscaps of the init ns.
> + *
> + * @flags currently only containers the effective bit. The
> + * other bits are reserved, and must be 0 at the moment.
> + * @rootid contains the kuid value of the root in the namespace
> + * for which this capability should be used. If -1, then this
> + * works for all namespaces. Only root in the initial ns can
> + * use this.
> + *
> + * Q: do we want to use a range instead? Then root in a container
> + * could allow one binary with one capability to be used by any
> + * nested containers.
> + */
> +#define VFS_NS_CAP_EFFECTIVE 0x1
> +struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> + __le32 flags;
> + __le32 rootid;
> + struct {
> + __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
> + __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
> + } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * 32-bit hdr_info contains
> + * 16 leftmost: reserved
> + * next 8: ncaps
> + * last 8: version
> + */
> +struct vfs_ns_cap_header {
> + __le32 hdr_info;
> + /* ncaps * vfs_ns_cap_data */
> +};
> +
> #ifndef __KERNEL__
>
> /*
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
> index 1590c49..67c80ab 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/xattr.h
> @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@
> #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability"
> #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX
>
> +#define XATTR_NS_CAPS_SUFFIX "nscapability"
> +#define XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_NS_CAPS_SUFFIX
> +
> #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS "posix_acl_access"
> #define XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS
> #define XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT "posix_acl_default"
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 1832cf7..c44edf3 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -308,6 +308,10 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
> return 0;
>
> + error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS, NULL, 0);
> + if (error > 0)
> + return 1;
> +
> error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
> if (error <= 0)
> return 0;
> @@ -325,11 +329,17 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> + int ret1, ret2;;
>
> if (!inode->i_op->removexattr)
> return 0;
>
> - return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
> + ret1 = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
> + ret2 = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS);
> +
> + if (ret1 != 0)
> + return ret1;
> + return ret2;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -433,6 +443,117 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> return 0;
> }
>
> +int get_vfs_ns_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> + unsigned tocopy, i;
> + int ret = 0, size, expected;
> + unsigned len = 0;
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_header *hdr;
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *cap, *nscap = NULL;
> + __u16 ncaps, version;
> + __u32 hdr_info;
> + kuid_t current_root, caprootuid;
> +
> + memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(*cpu_caps));
> +
> + if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
> + return -ENODATA;
> +
> + /* get the size */
> + size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS,
> + NULL, 0);
> + if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> + /* no data, that's ok */
> + return -ENODATA;
> + if (size < 0)
> + return size;
> + if (size < sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_ns_cap_header))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (size > sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_ns_cap_header) + 255 * sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + len = size;
> +
> + hdr = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
> + if (!hdr)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS, hdr,
> + len);
> + if (size < 0) {
> + ret = size;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (size != len) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + hdr_info = le32_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_info);
> + version = NS_CAPS_VERSION(hdr_info);
> + ncaps = NS_CAPS_NCAPS(hdr_info);
> +
> + if (version != VFS_NS_CAP_REVISION) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + expected = sizeof(*hdr) + ncaps * sizeof(*cap);
> + if (size != expected) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32;
> +
> + /* find an applicable entry */
> + /* a global entry (uid == -1) takes precedence */
> + current_root = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), 0);
> + if (!uid_valid(current_root)) {
> + /* no root user in this namespace; no capabilities */
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0, cap = (void *) hdr + sizeof(*hdr); i < ncaps; cap += sizeof(*cap), i++) {
> + uid_t uid = le32_to_cpu(cap->rootid);
> + if (uid == -1) {
> + nscap = cap;
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + caprootuid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid);
> + if (uid_eq(caprootuid, current_root))
> + nscap = cap;
> + }
> +
> + if (!nscap) {
> + /* nothing found for this namespace */
> + ret = -ENODATA;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + /* copy the entry */
> + CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
> + if (i >= tocopy)
> + break;
> + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(nscap->data[i].permitted);
> + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(nscap->data[i].inheritable);
> + }
> +
> + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> +
> + cpu_caps->magic_etc = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
> + if (nscap->flags & VFS_NS_CAP_EFFECTIVE)
> + cpu_caps->magic_etc |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> +
> +out:
> + kfree(hdr);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
> * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
> @@ -451,11 +572,13 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
> if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> return 0;
>
> - rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> + rc = get_vfs_ns_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> + if (rc == -ENODATA)
> + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> if (rc < 0) {
> if (rc == -EINVAL)
> - printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
> - __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
> + printk(KERN_NOTICE "Got EINVAL reading file caps for %s\n",
> + bprm->filename);
> else if (rc == -ENODATA)
> rc = 0;
> goto out;
> @@ -651,7 +774,7 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> {
> - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> + if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) || !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS)) {
> if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> return -EPERM;
> return 0;
> @@ -677,7 +800,7 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> */
> int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> {
> - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> + if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) || !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_NS_CAPS)) {
> if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> return -EPERM;
> return 0;
--
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