On Tue, 2015-10-27 at 11:50 +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > >expose that critically limited API to userspace. We need to expose an > >API which supports hardware keys, and basically that means using the > >kernel's key subsystem. > > Agreed. But at the same time, that interface should be able to support the use > case where the software wants to be in control (just take OpenSSL as the > simple example where you can add an engine for the Linux kernel backed RSA > operation). Absolutely. The interface needs to support *both*. I've spent a lot of time chasing through userspace stacks, fixing broken assumptions that we will *always* have the actual key material in a file — and making libraries and applications accept PKCS#11 URIs referring to keys in hardware as well as filenames. I am violently opposed to exposing an API from the kernel which makes that *same* fundamental mistake, and ties its users to using *only* software keys. FROM THE BEGINNING, users of this new API should be able to cope with the fact that they might not *have* the key material, and that they might simply be referring to a key which exists elsewhere. Such as in the TPM, or within an SGX software enclave. -- dwmw2
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