Hi, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxxxx> writes: > On 10/8/15 11:20 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote: >> Hi Alexei, >> >> On Thu, Oct 8, 2015, at 07:23, Alexei Starovoitov wrote: >>> The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. >>> This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, >>> bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, >>> and the toggle cannot be set back to false. >> >> This approach seems fine to me. >> >> I am wondering if it makes sense to somehow allow ebpf access per >> namespace? I currently have no idea how that could work and on which >> namespace type to depend or going with a prctl or even cgroup maybe. The >> rationale behind this is, that maybe some namespaces like openstack >> router namespaces could make usage of advanced ebpf capabilities in the >> kernel, while other namespaces, especially where untrusted third parties >> are hosted, shouldn't have access to those facilities. >> >> In that way, hosters would be able to e.g. deploy more efficient >> performance monitoring container (which should still need not to run as >> root) while the majority of the users has no access to that. Or think >> about routing instances in some namespaces, etc. etc. > > when we're talking about eBPF for networking or performance monitoring > it's all going to be under root anyway. I am not so sure, actually. Like PCP (Performance CoPilot), which does long term collecting of performance data in the kernel and maybe sending it over the network, it would be great if at least some capabilities could be dropped after the bpf filedescriptor was allocated. But current bpf syscall always checks capabilities on every call, which is actually quite unusual for capabilities. For networking the basic technique was also to drop capabilities sooner than later. Can we filter bpf syscall finegrained with selinux? > The next question is > how to let the programs run only for traffic or for applications within > namespaces. Something gotta do this demux. It either can be in-kernel > C code which is configured via some API that calls different eBPF > programs based on cgroup or based on netns, or it can be another > eBPF program that does demux on its own. This sounds quite complex. Afaics this problem hasn't even be solved in perf so far, tracepoints hit independent of the namespace currently. > In case of tracing such 'demuxing' program can be attached to kernel > events and call 'worker' programs via tail_call, so that 'worker' > programs will have an illusion that they're working only with events > that belong to their namespace. > imo existing facilities already allow 'per namespace' eBPF, though > the prog_array used to jump from 'demuxing' bpf into 'worker' bpf > currently is a bit awkward to use (because of FD passing via daemon), > but that will get solved soon. Aha, so client namespaces hand over their fds to parent demuxer and it sets up the necessary calls. Yeah, this seems to work. > It feels that in-kernel C code doing filtering may be > 'more robust' from namespace isolation point of view, but I don't > think we have a concrete and tested proposal, so I would > experiment with 'demuxing' bpf first. > The programs in general don't have a notion of namespace. They > need to be attached to veth via TC to get packets for > particular namespace. Okay. For me namespacing of ebpf code is actually not that important, I would much rather like to control which namespace is allowed to execute ebpf in an unpriviledged manner. Like Thomas wrote, a capability was great for that, but I don't know if any new capabilities will be added. Thanks, Hannes -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
