On Sat, May 16, 2015 at 5:46 AM, Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 05/15/2015 05:05 PM, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Thursday, May 14, 2015 11:23:09 PM Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>> On Thu, May 14, 2015 at 7:32 PM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> On 15/05/14, Paul Moore wrote: >>>>> * Look at our existing audit records to determine which records should >>>>> have >>>>> namespace and container ID tokens added. We may only want to add the >>>>> additional fields in the case where the namespace/container ID tokens are >>>>> not the init namespace. >>>> If we have a record that ties a set of namespace IDs with a container >>>> ID, then I expect we only need to list the containerID along with auid >>>> and sessionID. >>> The problem here is that the kernel has no concept of a "container", and I >>> don't think it makes any sense to add one just for audit. "Container" is a >>> marketing term used by some userspace tools. >>> >>> I can imagine that both audit could benefit from a concept of a >>> namespace *path* that understands nesting (e.g. root/2/5/1 or >>> something along those lines). Mapping these to "containers" belongs >>> in userspace, I think. >> It might be helpful to climb up a few levels in this thread ... >> >> I think we all agree that containers are not a kernel construct. I further >> believe that the kernel has no business generating container IDs, those should >> come from userspace and will likely be different depending on how you define >> "container". However, what is less clear to me at this point is how the >> kernel should handle the setting, reporting, and general management of this >> container ID token. >> > Wouldn't the easiest thing be to just treat add a containerid to the > process context like auid. I believe so. At least that was the point I was trying to get across when I first jumped into this thread. > Then make it a privileged operation to set it. Then tools that care about > auditing like docker can set the ID > and remove the Capability from it sub processes if it cares. All > processes adopt parent processes containerid. > Now containers can be audited and as long as userspace is written > correctly nested containers can either override the containerid or not > depending on what the audit rules are. This part I'm still less certain on. I agree that setting the container ID should be privileged in some sense, but the kernel shouldn't *require* privilege to create a new container (however the user chooses to define it). Simply requiring privilege to set the container ID and failing silently may be sufficient. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
