On Mon, 23 Feb 2015, Serge Hallyn wrote: > The core concern for amorgan is that an unprivileged user not be > able to cause a privileged program to run in a way that it fails to > drop privilege before running unprivileged-user-provided code. I do not see a problem with dropping privilege since the ambient set is supposed to be preserved across a drop of priviledge. > Since your desire is precisely for a mode where dropping privilege > works as usual, but exec then re-gains some or all of that privilege, I would say that the ambient set stays active even if the setuid binary drops to regular perms. > we need to either agree on a way to enter that mode that ordinary > use caes can't be tricked into using, or find a way for legacy > users to be tpiped off as to what's going on (without having to be > re-written) Well if the ambient set is completely separate then the existing semantics are preserved while the ambient set stays active as intended. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
