- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
A value of 0 means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.
A value of 1 means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descedent user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.
- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls
currently do not pass in a struct file so file_ns_capable
is unusable.
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 31 ++++++++++----
include/linux/user_namespace.h | 25 +++++++++++
kernel/groups.c | 1 +
kernel/user.c | 1 +
kernel/user_namespace.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 772efa45a452..4ebed9f01d97 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2386,7 +2386,7 @@ static int proc_tgid_io_accounting(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
#endif /* CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING */
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
-static int proc_id_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+static int proc_userns_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *seq_ops)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = NULL;
@@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ err:
return ret;
}
-static int proc_id_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int proc_userns_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
@@ -2428,17 +2428,17 @@ static int proc_id_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
static int proc_uid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_uid_seq_operations);
+ return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_uid_seq_operations);
}
static int proc_gid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_gid_seq_operations);
+ return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_gid_seq_operations);
}
static int proc_projid_map_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- return proc_id_map_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
+ return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_projid_seq_operations);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_uid_map_operations = {
@@ -2446,7 +2446,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_uid_map_operations = {
.write = proc_uid_map_write,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = proc_id_map_release,
+ .release = proc_userns_release,
};
static const struct file_operations proc_gid_map_operations = {
@@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_gid_map_operations = {
.write = proc_gid_map_write,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = proc_id_map_release,
+ .release = proc_userns_release,
};
static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
@@ -2462,7 +2462,20 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_projid_map_operations = {
.write = proc_projid_map_write,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = proc_id_map_release,
+ .release = proc_userns_release,
+};
+
+static int proc_setgroups_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return proc_userns_open(inode, file, &proc_setgroups_seq_operations);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_setgroups_operations = {
+ .open = proc_setgroups_open,
+ .write = proc_setgroups_write,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = proc_userns_release,
};
#endif /* CONFIG_USER_NS */
@@ -2572,6 +2585,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
REG("timers", S_IRUGO, proc_timers_operations),
@@ -2913,6 +2927,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
REG("uid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_uid_map_operations),
REG("gid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_gid_map_operations),
REG("projid_map", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_projid_map_operations),
+ REG("setgroups", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_setgroups_operations),
#endif
};
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 41cc26e5a350..6451c401dcf6 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -17,6 +17,12 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
} extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_EXTENTS];
};
+enum user_namespace_flags {
+ USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED,
+};
+
+#define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS BIT(USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)
+
struct user_namespace {
struct uid_gid_map uid_map;
struct uid_gid_map gid_map;
@@ -27,6 +33,7 @@ struct user_namespace {
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
unsigned int proc_inum;
+ unsigned long flags;
/* Register of per-UID persistent keyrings for this namespace */
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
@@ -46,6 +53,22 @@ static inline bool userns_gid_mappings_established(const struct user_namespace *
return established;
}
+static inline bool userns_setgroups_allowed(const struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ bool allowed;
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ allowed = test_bit(USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED, &ns->flags);
+ smp_mb__after_atomic();
+ return allowed;
+}
+
+static inline void userns_disable_setgroups(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ clear_bit(USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED, &ns->flags);
+ smp_mb__after_atomic();
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -69,9 +92,11 @@ struct seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_uid_seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_gid_seq_operations;
extern const struct seq_operations proc_projid_seq_operations;
+extern const struct seq_operations proc_setgroups_seq_operations;
extern ssize_t proc_uid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_gid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
+extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
#else
static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index e0335e44f76a..2f136fda7c4d 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ bool may_setgroups(void)
* the user namespace has been established.
*/
return userns_gid_mappings_established(user_ns) &&
+ userns_setgroups_allowed(user_ns) &&
ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID);
}
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 4efa39350e44..2d09940c9632 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+ .flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS,
#ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS
.persistent_keyring_register_sem =
__RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.persistent_keyring_register_sem),
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 413f60fd5983..3d128f91ced3 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
ns->level = parent_ns->level + 1;
ns->owner = owner;
ns->group = group;
+ ns->flags = USERNS_INIT_FLAGS;
+
+ /* Copy USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from the parent user namespace */
+ if (!userns_setgroups_allowed(parent_ns))
+ userns_disable_setgroups(ns);
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
@@ -841,6 +846,98 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
return false;
}
+static void *setgroups_m_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+
+ return (*ppos == 0) ? ns : NULL;
+}
+
+static void *setgroups_m_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ ++*ppos;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void setgroups_m_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static int setgroups_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n",
+ test_bit(USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED, &ns->flags) ?
+ "allow" : "deny");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct seq_operations proc_setgroups_seq_operations = {
+ .start = setgroups_m_start,
+ .stop = setgroups_m_stop,
+ .next = setgroups_m_next,
+ .show = setgroups_m_show,
+};
+
+ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
+ struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
+ char kbuf[8], *pos;
+ bool setgroups_allowed;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ if (!file_ns_capable(file, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Only allow a very narrow range of strings to be written */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= sizeof(kbuf)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* What was written? */
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+ kbuf[count] = '\0';
+ pos = kbuf;
+
+ /* What is being requested? */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (strncmp(pos, "allow", 5) == 0) {
+ pos += 5;
+ setgroups_allowed = true;
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(pos, "deny", 4) == 0) {
+ pos += 4;
+ setgroups_allowed = false;
+ }
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Verify there is not trailing junk on the line */
+ pos = skip_spaces(pos);
+ if (*pos != '\0')
+ goto out;
+
+ if (setgroups_allowed) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!userns_setgroups_allowed(ns))
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ userns_disable_setgroups(ns);
+ }
+
+ /* Report a successful write */
+ *ppos = count;
+ ret = count;
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
static void *userns_get(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns;
--
1.9.1
--
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