On Thu, Nov 27, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Classic unix permission checks have an interesting feature. The group
> permissions for a file can be set to less than the other permissions
> on a file. Occassionally this is used deliberately to give a certain
> group of users fewer permissions than the default.
>
> Overlooking negative groups has resulted in the permission checks for
> setting up a group mapping in a user namespace to be too lax. Tighten
> the permission checks in new_idmap_permitted to ensure that mapping
> uids and gids into user namespaces without privilege will not result
> in new combinations of credentials being available to the users.
>
> When setting mappings without privilege only the creator of the user
> namespace is interesting as all other users that have CAP_SETUID over
> the user namespace will also have CAP_SETUID over the user namespaces
> parent. So the scope of the unprivileged check is reduced to just
> the case where cred->euid is the namespace creator.
>
> For setting a uid mapping without privilege only euid is considered as
> setresuid can set uid, suid and fsuid from euid without privielege
> making any combination of uids possible with user namespaces already
> possible without them.
>
> For setting a gid mapping without privilege only egid on a credential
> without supplementary groups is condsidered, as setresgid can set gid,
> sgid and fsgid from egid without privilege. The requirement for no
> supplementary groups is because CAP_SETUID in a user namespace allows
> supplementary groups to be cleared, which unfortunately means allowing
> a credential with supplementary groups would allow new combinations
> of credentials to exist, and thus would allow defeating negative
> groups without permission.
>
> This change should break userspace by the minimal amount needed
> to fix this issue.
>
> This should fix CVE-2014-8989.
I think this is both unnecessarily restrictive and that it doesn't fix
the bug. For example, I can exploit CVE-2014-8989 without ever
writing a uid map or a gid map.
IIUC, the only real issue is that user namespaces allow groups to be
dropped using setgroups that wouldn't otherwise be dropped. Can we
get away with adding a per-user-ns flag that determines whether
setgroups can be used?
setgroups would be unusable until the gid_map has been written and
then it would become usable if and only if the parent userns could use
setgroups and the opener of gid_map was privileged.
If we wanted to allow finer-grained control, we could allow writing
control lines like:
options +setgroups
or
options -setgroups
in gid_map, or we could add user_ns_flags that can only be written
once and only before either uid_map or gid_map is written.
--Andy
>
> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> If people can test and review this change and verify this and verify it
> doesn't break anything I can't help breaking I will appreciate it.
>
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index aa312b0dc3ec..b338c42d04fd 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -812,16 +812,24 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
> struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
> struct uid_gid_map *new_map)
> {
> - /* Allow mapping to your own filesystem ids */
> - if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1)) {
> + const struct cred *cred = file->f_cred;
> +
> + /* Allow mapping an id without CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID when
> + * allowing the root of the user namespace CAP_SETUID or
> + * CAP_SETGID restricted to just that id will not change the
> + * set of credentials available that user.
> + */
> + if ((new_map->nr_extents == 1) && (new_map->extent[0].count == 1) &&
> + uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) {
> u32 id = new_map->extent[0].lower_first;
> if (cap_setid == CAP_SETUID) {
> kuid_t uid = make_kuid(ns->parent, id);
> - if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
> + if (uid_eq(uid, cred->euid))
> return true;
> } else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
> kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
> - if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
> + if (gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) &&
> + (cred->group_info->ngroups == 0))
> return true;
> }
> }
> --
> 1.9.1
>
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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