On November 3, 2014 7:42:58 AM PST, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >On Mon, Nov 3, 2014 at 7:20 AM, Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >wrote: >> On Mon, Nov 03, 2014 at 11:48:23AM +0000, David Drysdale wrote: >>> Add a new O_BENEATH flag for openat(2) which restricts the >>> provided path, rejecting (with -EACCES) paths that are not beneath >>> the provided dfd. In particular, reject: >>> - paths that contain .. components >>> - paths that begin with / >>> - symlinks that have paths as above. >> >> Yecch... The degree of usefulness aside (and I'm not convinced that >it >> is non-zero), > >This is extremely useful in conjunction with seccomp. > >> WTF pass one bit out of nameidata->flags in a separate argument? >> Through the mutual recursion, no less... And then you are not even >attempting >> to detect symlinks that are not followed by interpretation of _any_ >pathname. > >How many symlinks like that are there? Is there anything except >nd_jump_link users? All of those are in /proc. Arguably O_BENEATH >should prevent traversal of all of those links. Not commenting on the sanity of this one way or another, and I haven't read the patch. There is an absolutely trivial implementation of this. After the path is resolved, walk backwards along d_parent and the mount tree, and see if you come to the file or directory dfd refers to. That can handle magic proc symlinks, and does not need to disallow .. or / explicitly so it should be much simpler code. My gut says that if Al says blech when looking at your code it is too complex to give you a security guarantee. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
