On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 6:18 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> [cc: Eric Biederman]
>
> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 8:59 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Jul 25, 2014 6:48 AM, "David Drysdale" <drysdale@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Add the current thread and thread group IDs into the data
>>>> available for seccomp-bpf programs to work on. This allows
>>>> installation of filters that police syscalls based on thread
>>>> or process ID, e.g. tgkill(2)/kill(2)/prctl(2).
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 10 ++++++++++
>>>> kernel/seccomp.c | 2 ++
>>>> 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>>>> index ac2dc9f72973..b88370d6f6ca 100644
>>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
>>>> @@ -36,12 +36,22 @@
>>>> * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
>>>> * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
>>>> * regardless of the architecture.
>>>> + * @tgid: thread group ID of the thread executing the BPF program.
>>>> + * @tid: thread ID of the thread executing the BPF program.
>>>> + * The SECCOMP_DATA_TID_PRESENT macro indicates the presence of the
>>>> + * tgid and tid fields; user programs may use this macro to conditionally
>>>> + * compile code against older versions of the kernel. Note also that
>>>> + * BPF programs should cope with the absence of these fields by testing
>>>> + * the length of data available.
>>>> */
>>>> struct seccomp_data {
>>>> int nr;
>>>> __u32 arch;
>>>> __u64 instruction_pointer;
>>>> __u64 args[6];
>>>> + __u32 tgid;
>>>> + __u32 tid;
>>>> };
>>>> +#define SECCOMP_DATA_TID_PRESENT 1
>>>>
>>>> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>>>> index 301bbc24739c..dd5146f15d6d 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>>>> @@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
>>>> sd->args[4] = args[4];
>>>> sd->args[5] = args[5];
>>>> sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
>>>> + sd->tgid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
>>>> + sd->tid = task_pid_vnr(current);
>>>> }
>>>
>>> This is, IMO, problematic. These should probably be relative to the
>>> filter creator, not the filtered task. This will also hurt
>>> performance.
>>
>> Yeah, we can't change the seccomp_data structure without a lot of
>> care, and tgid/tid really should be encoded in the filter. However, it
>> is tricky in the forking case.
>>
>>>
>>> What's the use case? Can it be better achieved with a new eBPF function?
The specific use case is to be able to write a filter that allows kill(2)
or tgkill(2) to self, where the filter still works after forking. Capsicum
capability mode in general locks down system calls that access PIDs
(as they're a global namespace), but allows kill(self) as a pragmatic
compromise to make it easier to migrate applications to use Capsicum.
>> Julien had been wanting something like this too (though he'd suggested
>> it via prctl): limit the signal functions to "self" only. I wonder if
>> adding a prctl like done for O_BENEATH could work for signal sending?
>>
>
>
> Can we do one better and add a flag to prevent any non-self pid
> lookups? This might actually be easy on top of the pid namespace work
> (e.g. we could change the way that find_task_by_vpid works).
That sounds like a good idea, as long as it's possible for
non-CAP_SYS_ADMIN processes to do....
> It's far from just being signals. There's access_process_vm, ptrace,
> all the signal functions, clock_gettime (see CPUCLOCK_PID -- yes, this
> is ridiculous), and probably some others that I've forgotten about or
> never noticed in the first place.
For the Capsicum case in particular, most of these are restricted
by the capability mode filter anyhow (although I need to fix it for
CPUCLOCK_PID -- thanks for pointing that out); the kill(2) case
was a special case to make migrations easier. But a more general
mechanism seems sensible.
> --Andy
>
>> -Kees
>>
>> --
>> Kees Cook
>> Chrome OS Security
>
>
>
> --
> Andy Lutomirski
> AMA Capital Management, LLC
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