On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 03:00:45PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > And we'll be in a sad state in which we have a getrandom(2) syscall > but there's no decent way to use srand without either opening > /dev/urandom or mucking with AT_RANDOM. And the latter barely works > because I think that most (all?) glibc versions clear it after using > it to initialize their stack canaries. Sorry, I really don't think that supporting srand() is a good use of getrandom(2). If it's for non-crypto purposes, using getpid() and time() is *just* *fine*. If we add such a flag, my big fear is that it gets misused. Sometimes it does make sense to create interfaces that a strong point of view. The primary use of getrandom(2) should be for cryptographic purposes, and trying to avoid misuse should be the primary objective. - Ted -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
