On Mon, Jul 14, 2014 at 6:53 PM, James Morris <james.l.morris@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 07/15/2014 04:59 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> Hi James, >> >> Is this series something you would carry in the security-next tree? >> That has traditionally been where seccomp features have landed in the >> past. >> >> -Kees >> >> >> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 10:55 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>> On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 9:49 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 07/10, Kees Cook wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This adds the ability for threads to request seccomp filter >>>>> synchronization across their thread group (at filter attach time). >>>>> For example, for Chrome to make sure graphic driver threads are fully >>>>> confined after seccomp filters have been attached. >>>>> >>>>> To support this, locking on seccomp changes via thread-group-shared >>>>> sighand lock is introduced, along with refactoring of no_new_privs. >>>>> Races >>>>> with thread creation are handled via delayed duplication of the seccomp >>>>> task struct field and cred_guard_mutex. >>>>> >>>>> This includes a new syscall (instead of adding a new prctl option), >>>>> as suggested by Andy Lutomirski and Michael Kerrisk. >>>> >>>> >>>> I do not not see any problems in this version, >>> >>> >>> Awesome! Thank you for all the reviews. :) If Andy and Michael are >>> happy with this too, I think this is in good shape. \o/ >>> >>> -Kees >>> >>>> >>>> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Kees Cook >>> Chrome OS Security >> >> >> >> > > Yep, certainly. > Any ETA? I'm currently blocking on having stable commit hashes for these. If you're planning on pulling from Kees' tree instead of importing the patches, I can work with that, too. Thanks, Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
