Re: [PATCH v8 9/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC

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On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 11:09 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:57 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 10:24 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 06/25, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 9:52 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Yes, at least this should close the race with suid-exec. And there are no
>>>> > other users. Except apparmor, and I hope you will check it because I simply
>>>> > do not know what it does ;)
>>>> >
>>>> >> I wonder if changes to nnp need to "flushed" during syscall entry
>>>> >> instead of getting updated externally/asynchronously? That way it
>>>> >> won't be out of sync with the seccomp mode/filters.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Perhaps secure computing needs to check some (maybe seccomp-only)
>>>> >> atomic flags and flip on the "real" nnp if found?
>>>> >
>>>> > Not sure I understand you, could you clarify?
>>>>
>>>> Instead of having TSYNC change the nnp bit, it can set a new flag, say:
>>>>
>>>>     task->seccomp.flags |= SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP;
>>>>
>>>> This would be set along with seccomp.mode, seccomp.filter, and
>>>> TIF_SECCOMP. Then, during the next secure_computing() call that thread
>>>> makes, it would check the flag:
>>>>
>>>>     if (task->seccomp.flags & SECCOMP_NEEDS_NNP)
>>>>         task->nnp = 1;
>>>>
>>>> This means that nnp couldn't change in the middle of a running syscall.
>>>
>>> Aha, so you were worried about the same thing. Not sure we need this,
>>> but at least I understand you and...
>>>
>>>> Hmmm. Perhaps this doesn't solve anything, though? Perhaps my proposal
>>>> above would actually make things worse, since now we'd have a thread
>>>> with seccomp set up, and no nnp. If it was in the middle of exec,
>>>> we're still causing a problem.
>>>
>>> Yes ;)
>>>
>>>> I think we'd also need a way to either delay the seccomp changes, or
>>>> to notice this condition during exec. Bleh.
>>>
>>> Hmm. confused again,
>>
>> I mean to suggest that the tsync changes would be stored in each
>> thread, but somewhere other than the true seccomp struct, but with
>> TIF_SECCOMP set. When entering secure_computing(), current would check
>> for the "changes to sync", and apply them, then start the syscall. In
>> this way, we can never race a syscall (like exec).
>
> I'm not sure that helps.  If you set a pending filter part-way through
> exec, and exec copies that pending filter but doesn't notice NNP, then
> there's an exploitable race.
>
>>
>>>> What actually happens with a multi-threaded process calls exec? I
>>>> assume all the other threads are destroyed?
>>>
>>> Yes. But this is the point-of-no-return, de_thread() is called after the execing
>>> thared has already passed (say) check_unsafe_exec().
>>>
>>> However, do_execve() takes cred_guard_mutex at the start in prepare_bprm_creds()
>>> and drops it in install_exec_creds(), so it should solve the problem?
>>
>> I can't tell yet. I'm still trying to understand the order of
>> operations here. It looks like de_thread() takes the sighand lock.
>> do_execve_common does:
>>
>> prepare_bprm_creds (takes cred_guard_mutex)
>> check_unsafe_exec (checks nnp to set LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
>> prepare_binprm (handles suid escalation, checks nnp separately)
>>     security_bprm_set_creds (checks LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
>> exec_binprm
>>     load_elf_binary
>>         flush_old_exec
>>             de_thread (takes and releases sighand->lock)
>>         install_exec_creds (releases cred_guard_mutex)
>>
>> I don't see a way to use cred_guard_mutex during tsync (which holds
>> sighand->lock) without dead-locking. What were you considering here?
>
> Grab cred_guard_mutex and then sighand->lock, perhaps?

Ah, yes, task->signal is like sighand: shared across all threads.

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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