On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 1:06 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> On Mon, Jun 2, 2014 at 12:47 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> Hi Andrew, >>>> >>>> Would you be willing to carry this series? Andy Lutomirski appears >>>> happy with it now. (Thanks again for all the feedback Andy!) If so, it >>>> has a relatively small merge conflict with the bpf changes living in >>>> net-next. Would you prefer I rebase against net-next, let sfr handle >>>> it, get carried in net-next, or some other option? >>> >>> Well, I'm still not entirely convinced that we want to have this much >>> multiplexing in a prctl, and I'm still a bit unconvinced that the code >> >> I don't want to get caught without interface argument flexibility >> again, so that's why the prctl interface is being set up that way. > > I was thinking that a syscall might be a lot prettier. It may pay to > cc linux-api, too. > > I'll offer you a deal: if you try to come up with a nice, clean > syscall, I'll try to write a fast(er) path for x86_64 to reduce > overhead. I bet I can save 90-100ns per syscall. :) Now added to the Cc. Which path do you mean to improve? Neither the prctl nor a syscall for this would need to be fast at all. I don't want to go in circles on this. I've been there before on my VFS link hardening series, and my module restriction series. I would like consensus from more than just one person. :) I'd like to hear from other folks on this (akpm?). My instinct is to continue using prctl since that is already where mediation for seccomp happens. I don't see why prctl vs a new syscall makes a difference here, frankly. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-api" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html