On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 08:43:58AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> ....
> > FWIW, I agree with Christian that these behaviours are not ideal (and
> > I'm working on a series that might allow for these things to be properly
> > blocked in the future) but there's also the consistency argument -- I
> > don't think fchownat() is much safer to allow in this way than
> > fchmodat() and (again) this behaviour is already possible through
> > procfs.
>
> If the 'through procfs' involves readlink("/proc/self/fd/n") and
> accessing through the returned path then the permission checks
> are different.
> Using the returned path requires search permissions on all the
> directories.
That's *not* how "through procfs" works. The "magic symlinks" in
/proc/*/fd are not actual symlinks that get dereferenced to the
contents they readlink() to, but special-type objects that dereference
directly to the underlying file associated with the open file
description.
Rich
