Hi Eric,
On 16/06/21 7:30 am, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
The io_uring tasks are special in that they are user process
threads that never run in userspace. So as long as everything
ptrace can read is accessible on that process all is well.
OK, I'm testing a patch that would save extra context in sys_io_uring_setup,
which ought to ensure that for m68k.
I had to update ret_from_kernel_thread to pop that state to get Linus's
change to boot. Apparently kernel_threads exiting needs to be handled.
Hadn't yet got to that stage, sorry. Still stress testing stage 1 of my
fix (push complete context). I would have thought that this should be
sufficient (gives us a complete stack frame for ptrace code to work on)?
But it makes sense that when you push an extra stack frame, you'd need
to pop that on exit.
Having stared a bit longer at the code I think the short term
fix for both of PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT and io_uring is to guard
them both with CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK.
Which does not work because nios2 which looks susceptible
sets CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK.
A further look shows that there is also PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC that
needs to be handled so execve and execveat need to be wrapped
as well.
Do you happen to know if there is userspace that will run
in qemu-system-m68k that can be used for testing?
I surmise so. I don't use qemu myself - either ARAnyM, or actual
hardware. Hardware is limited to 14 MB RAM, which has prevented me from
using more than simple regression testing. In particular, I can't test
sys_io_uring_setup there.
Adrian uses qemu a lot, and has supplied disk images to work from on
occasion. Maybe he's got something recent enough to support
sys_io_uring_setup ... I've CC:ed him in, as I'd love to do some more
testing as well.
Cheers,
Michael
Eric
