From: Michael Buesch <mb@xxxxxxxxx> Avoid heap trashing triggered by an integer overflow of the userspace controlled "count" variable. If userspace passes in a "count" of (size_t)-1l, the kmalloc size will overflow to ((size_t)-1l + 1) = 0. If kmalloc() is called with zero size, it will return the ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is (void *)16. This will pass the !tmp_buffer sanity check. After that, copy_from_user() will attempt to copy 0xFFFFFFFF (or 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF on 64bit) bytes to (void *)16, which is within the NULL page. A possible testcase could look like this: #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { int fd; char *buf; if (argc != 2) { printf("Usage: %s /proc/acpi/toshiba/filename\n", argv[0]); return 1; } fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { printf("Could not open proc file\n"); return 1; } buf = malloc(1337); if (!buf) { printf("Out of memory\n"); return 1; } memset(buf, 0x66, 1337); write(fd, buf, (size_t)-1l); /* boom!! */ } We avoid the integer overrun by putting an arbitrary limit on the count. PAGE_SIZE sounds like a sane limit. Signed-off-by: Michael Buesch <mb@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxx --- This patch is completely untested due to lack of supported device. The proc file is only writeable by root in the default setup, so it's probably not exploitable as-is. The toshiba-acpi driver is orphaned, so I hope somebody will pick this up. --- drivers/platform/x86/toshiba_acpi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) --- linux-2.6.orig/drivers/platform/x86/toshiba_acpi.c +++ linux-2.6/drivers/platform/x86/toshiba_acpi.c @@ -388,20 +388,22 @@ dispatch_read(char *page, char **start, return len; } static int dispatch_write(struct file *file, const char __user * buffer, unsigned long count, ProcItem * item) { int result; char *tmp_buffer; + if (count > PAGE_SIZE - 1) + return -EINVAL; /* Arg buffer points to userspace memory, which can't be accessed * directly. Since we're making a copy, zero-terminate the * destination so that sscanf can be used on it safely. */ tmp_buffer = kmalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!tmp_buffer) return -ENOMEM; if (copy_from_user(tmp_buffer, buffer, count)) { result = -EFAULT; -- Greetings, Michael. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-acpi" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html