Am 18.11.24 um 20:43 schrieb Armin Wolf:
Am 09.11.24 um 05:41 schrieb Mario Limonciello:The name attribute shows the name of the associated platform profile handler. Tested-by: Mark Pearson <mpearson-lenovo@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@xxxxxxx> --- drivers/acpi/platform_profile.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/platform_profile.c b/drivers/acpi/platform_profile.c index ef6af2c655524..4e2eda18f7f5f 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/platform_profile.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/platform_profile.c @@ -25,8 +25,35 @@ static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(profile_names) == PLATFORM_PROFILE_LAST); static DEFINE_IDA(platform_profile_ida); +/** + * name_show - Show the name of the profile handler + * @dev: The device + * @attr: The attribute + * @buf: The buffer to write to + * Return: The number of bytes written + */ +static ssize_t name_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct platform_profile_handler *handler = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + + scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -ERESTARTSYS, &profile_lock) { + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", handler->name); + } + return -ERESTARTSYS;I still have a bad feeling about the locking inside the class attributes... Can we assume that no sysfs accesses occur after unregistering the class device? Even if this is not the case then the locking fails to protect the platform_profile_handler here. If the device is unregistered right after dev_get_drvdata() was called, then we would sill operate on possibly stale data once we take the profile_lock. Does someone have any clue how sysfs attributes act during removal?
I think i found the answer to my questions inside this patch series: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1390951311-15325-1-git-send-email-tj@xxxxxxxxxx It says that: kernfs / sysfs implement the "sever" semantic for userland accesses. When a node is removed, no further userland operations are allowed and the in-flight ones are drained before removal is finished. This makes policing post-mortem userland accesses trivial for its users. In this case taking the profile_lock when reading/writing class attributes seems to be unnecessary. Please remove the unnecessary locking inside the class attributes. Thanks, Armin Wolf
Thanks, Armin Wolf+} + +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(name); +static struct attribute *profile_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_name.attr, + NULL +}; +ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(profile); + static const struct class platform_profile_class = { .name = "platform-profile", + .dev_groups = profile_groups, }; static ssize_t platform_profile_choices_show(struct device *dev,
