On Sun, May 02, 2021 at 10:23:26AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > This reverts commit 03d1571d9513369c17e6848476763ebbd10ec2cb. > > While /sys/kernel/debug/acpi/custom_method is already a privileged-only > API providing proxied arbitrary write access to kernel memory[1][2], > with existing race conditions[3] in buffer allocation and use that could > lead to memory leaks and use-after-free conditions, the above commit > appears to accidentally make the use-after-free conditions even easier > to accomplish. ("buf" is a global variable and prior kfree()s would set > buf back to NULL.) > > This entire interface needs to be reworked (if not entirely removed). > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20110222193250.GA23913@xxxxxxxxxxx/ > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/201906221659.B618D83@keescook/ > [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170109231323.GA89642@beast/ > > Cc: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@xxxxxxxxxx> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 5 +---- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > index 7b54dc95d36b..36d95a02cd30 100644 > --- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > +++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c > @@ -53,10 +53,8 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, > if ((*ppos > max_size) || > (*ppos + count > max_size) || > (*ppos + count < count) || > - (count > uncopied_bytes)) { > - kfree(buf); > + (count > uncopied_bytes)) > return -EINVAL; > - } > > if (copy_from_user(buf + (*ppos), user_buf, count)) { > kfree(buf); > @@ -76,7 +74,6 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf, > add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE); > } > > - kfree(buf); > return count; > } > > -- > 2.25.1 > Thanks for the revert, I'll queue it up on my larger "umn.edu reverts" branch that I'll be sending out for review in a day or so. greg k-h