Hello, mailman behind libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx currently does not rewrite the From: header in DMARC-protected domains (with policy reject or quarantine), despite the statement below. Emails from such domains spread over the mailing list libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx just don’t reach the recipients, if the recipients honour DMARC. Every self-respecting email provider honours DMARC on incoming emails. Examples of such messages are: Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 20:21:44 +0000 (UTC) From: Joseph Landry Bougang Fotso <jlandry476@xxxxxxxx> To: <libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <430875294.6291091.1552422104235@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Source code From: Christian Lohmaier <lohmaier@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 13:30:00 +0100 Message-ID: <CAOPHaVTHunJpJYAX=0hdWX16GWSVCZ14v4ucFjeKRMZVJNEJnw@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Re: git Push to online project To: ahmed elshreif <ahmedtota29@xxxxxxxxx> Cc: libreoffice-dev <LibreOffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 10:10:05 +0000 (UTC) From: Joseph Landry Bougang Fotso <jlandry476@xxxxxxxx> To: <libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Message-ID: <252397585.1361268.1551953405875@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> In-Reply-To: <mailman.33.1551873602.27620.libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> References: <mailman.33.1551873602.27620.libreoffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: Introducing myself and question Regards Дилян On Tue, 2019-02-12 at 11:13 +0100, Michael Meeks via LibreOffice wrote: > Hi everyone, > > Just to make everyone aware of some of this change. The punch-line is > simple: beware of re-written From: and Reply-To: headers - and check > that your mail is going to whom you think it is. > > The behavior will differ depending on the sending domain so - somewhat > counter-intuitive. > > Just the messenger ;-) > > Michael. > > ---------- Forwarded message --------- > From: Daniel Stone <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 at 23:38 > Subject: PSA: Mailman changes, From addresses no longer accurate > To: <freedesktop@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, > <sitewranglers@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > Hi all, > We have hit another step change in aggressive anti-spam techniques > from major mail providers. Over the past few days, we saw a huge spike > in the number of mails we were failing to deliver to GMail and > outlook.com in particular. > > It looks like it is now no longer acceptable for us to break > DMARC/DKIM/SPF. These are DNS-based extensions to SMTP, which allow > domains to publish policies as to who should be allowed to send email > on their behalf. SPF provides source filtering, so e.g. > freedesktop.org could specify that no-one should accept mail with a > From: *@freedesktop.org unless it came from gabe.freedesktop.org. > Mailman completely breaks this: if I specified a filter only allowing > Google to send mail for @fooishbar.org, then anyone enforcing SPF > would reject receipt of this mail, as it would arrive from fd.o with > my From address. > > DKIM allows domains to publish a public key in DNS, inserting a header > into mails sent from their domain cryptographically signing the value > of named headers. Mailman breaks this too: changing the Sender header > (such that bounces get processed by Mailman, rather than sending a > deluge of out-of-office and mailbox-over-quota messages to whoever > posts to the list) can break most DKIM signatures. Mailman adding the > unsubscribe footer also breaks this; we could make it not add the > footer, but in order to do so we'd have to convince ourselves that we > were not decreasing our GDPR compliance. > > DMARC ties the two together, allowing domains to specify whether or > not DKIM/SPF should be mandatory, and if they fail, what action should > be taken. Despite some domains specifying a fail action of 'none' > (receiving MTA to send an advisory report to a named email address, > but still allow the email), it seems that popular services still > interpret 'none' as 'reject'. > > As a result, Google in particular is dropping some number of our mails > on the floor. This does _not_ just apply to mails which fail > DMARC/DKIM/SPF: every mail we send that fails these filters (which is > a lot - e.g. Intel and NVIDIA both have SPF) decreases our sender > reputation with GMail and causes it to reject legitimate mails. > > I've reached out to Google through a couple of channels to see what we > can do to increase our delivery rate to them. In the meantime, if your > mail is hosted by Google, or Outlook, and you think you're missing > mails - you probably are. > > Mailman has also now been reconfigured such that if it spots a > potential DMARC violation, it rewrites the From address to be > @lists.freedesktop.org, keeping the original author in Reply-To. It > also strips DKIM headers. This seems to be about the best we can do, > unless and until the major mail service providers offer us some > alternate way to send mail. If you are replying privately to someone, > you should check very carefully that you are replying to them and not > to the list. > > Unfortunately we don't have a good answer in the long run. The latest > published RFC at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6377 suggests that > there are no good solutions. If anyone is blessed with an abundance of > time and familiar with the current email landscape, I would love to > talk to you and get your help to work on this. Unfortunately we don't > have the manpower to actually properly monitor email; it can often > take a collapse in successful-delivery rates for us to notice. > > Ultimately, I suspect the best solution is to move most of our > discussions to dedicated fora like GitLab issues, or something like > Discourse. Fundamentally, the thing we're trying to do (send email to > thousands of people at a time using a fake From address) is ... kind > of the opposite of what the 2019 Internet wants us to do. Every few > months the major providers drop more of our mail as they become more > aggressive with spam, and every few months their userbase increases by > a non-trivial amount. > > We've done a lot of work on our email infrastructure, and are doing > our best to be a responsible citizen within the constraint of having > to launder mail and forge identity on an industrial scale, but it's > coming to the point where it just may not be possible to run such a > service at such a scale anymore. > > This is before even considering our other issues with Mailman 2.x: no > centralised identity management (mailing your passwords out every > month ... ?!), difficulty of GDPR compliance (editing archives > requires hand-editing every single HTML index, as there is no > non-destructive archive rebuild), the flat-out bugs (e.g. the mesa-dev > archives are usually missing half the messages), and the fact it's > been abandoned upstream in favour of Mailman 3.x, which is not > obviously better, nor is there a clear upgrade path to. > > Of course we do not have any plans to stop providing email any time > soon, but it might be worth thinking about what you can do to reduce > your dependency on email lists. At the current rate of degradation, it > might be non-viable quicker than you'd think. Maybe this is unduly > gloomy, but the entire internet's direction of travel has been away > from services like Mailman, and its velocity is only increasing. > > Cheers, > Daniel > _______________________________________________ > LibreOffice mailing list > LibreOffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/libreoffice _______________________________________________ LibreOffice mailing list LibreOffice@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/libreoffice