On Wed, Jul 11, 2012 at 11:18 PM, Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > We've confirmed that peer-to-peer between these devices is > not possible. We can therefore claim that they support a > subset of ACS. > > Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <Joerg.Roedel@xxxxxxx> > --- > > Two things about this patch make me a little nervous. The > first is that I'd really like to have a pci_is_pcie() test > in pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled(), but these devices don't > have a PCIe capability. That means that if there was a > topology where these devices sit on a legacy PCI bus, > we incorrectly return that we're ACS safe here. That leads > to my second problem, pciids seems to suggest that some of > these functions have been around for a while. Is it just > this package that's peer-to-peer safe, or is it safe to > assume that any previous assembly of these functions is > also p2p safe. Maybe we need to factor in device revs if > that uniquely identifies this package? > > Looks like another useful device to potentially quirk > would be: > > 00:15.0 PCI bridge: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] nee ATI SB700/SB800/SB900 PCI to PCI bridge (PCIE port 0) > 00:15.1 PCI bridge: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] nee ATI SB700/SB800/SB900 PCI to PCI bridge (PCIE port 1) > 00:15.2 PCI bridge: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] nee ATI SB900 PCI to PCI bridge (PCIE port 2) > 00:15.3 PCI bridge: Advanced Micro Devices [AMD] nee ATI SB900 PCI to PCI bridge (PCIE port 3) > > 00:15.0 0604: 1002:43a0 > 00:15.1 0604: 1002:43a1 > 00:15.2 0604: 1002:43a2 > 00:15.3 0604: 1002:43a3 > > drivers/pci/quirks.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/pci/quirks.c b/drivers/pci/quirks.c > index 4ebc865..2c84961 100644 > --- a/drivers/pci/quirks.c > +++ b/drivers/pci/quirks.c > @@ -3271,11 +3271,40 @@ struct pci_dev *pci_get_dma_source(struct pci_dev *dev) > return pci_dev_get(dev); > } > > +/* > + * Multifunction devices that do not support peer-to-peer between > + * functions can claim to support a subset of ACS. Such devices > + * effectively enable request redirect (RR) and completion redirect (CR) > + * since all transactions are redirected to the upstream root complex. > + */ > +static int pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags) > +{ > + if (!dev->multifunction) > + return -ENODEV; > + > + /* Filter out flags not applicable to multifunction */ > + acs_flags &= (PCI_ACS_RR | PCI_ACS_CR | PCI_ACS_EC | PCI_ACS_DT); > + > + return acs_flags & ~(PCI_ACS_RR | PCI_ACS_CR) ? 0 : 1; > +} > + > static const struct pci_dev_acs_enabled { > u16 vendor; > u16 device; > int (*acs_enabled)(struct pci_dev *dev, u16 acs_flags); > } pci_dev_acs_enabled[] = { > + /* > + * AMD/ATI multifunction southbridge devices. AMD has confirmed > + * that peer-to-peer between these devices is not possible, so > + * they do support a subset of ACS even though the capability is > + * not exposed in config space. > + */ > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x4385, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x439c, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x4383, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x439d, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x4384, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > + { PCI_VENDOR_ID_ATI, 0x4399, pci_mf_no_p2p_acs_enabled }, > { 0 } > }; > > I was looking for something else and found this old email. This patch hasn't been applied and I haven't seen any discussion about it. Is it still of interest? It seems relevant to the current ACS discussion [1]. If it's relevant, what's the topology? Apparently they don't have a PCIe capability. Is the upstream device a PCIe device (a downstream port or a root port)? I assume anything downstream from these AMD devices (0x4385, 0x439c, etc.) is plain PCI (not PCIe)? Bjorn [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130607163441.7733.23221.stgit@xxxxxxxxxx -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html