Re: [PATCH 3/5] KVM: MMU: simplify set_spte

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On Mon, Nov 05, 2012 at 08:11:03PM +0800, Xiao Guangrong wrote:
> It is more cleaner if we can update pte_access fist then set spte according
> to pte_access, also introduce gfn_need_write_protect to check whether the
> gfn need to be write-protected
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Please separate patch in:
- code movement with no logical modification.
- logical modification (such as condition for mark_page_dirty).
- move code to helper functions.

>  arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c |  109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>  1 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> index 4ea731e..49957df 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -2329,6 +2329,63 @@ static int mmu_need_write_protect(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn,
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> +static bool gfn_need_write_protect(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
> +				   int level,  gfn_t gfn, bool can_unsync)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
> +	 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
> +	 * is responsibility of mmu_get_page / kvm_sync_page.
> +	 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
> +	 */
> +	if (!can_unsync && is_writable_pte(*sptep))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if ((level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
> +	   has_wrprotected_page(vcpu->kvm, gfn, level)) ||
> +	      mmu_need_write_protect(vcpu, gfn, can_unsync))
> +		return true;
> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
> +/* The return value indicates whether the @gfn need to be write protected. */
> +static bool vcpu_adjust_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
> +			       unsigned *pte_access, int user_fault,
> +			       int write_fault, int level, gfn_t gfn,
> +			       bool can_unsync, bool host_writable)
> +{
> +	bool ret = false;
> +	unsigned access = *pte_access;
> +
> +	if (!host_writable)
> +		access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
> +
> +	if (!(access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) && (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map &&
> +	      write_fault && !is_write_protection(vcpu) && !user_fault)) {
> +		access |= ACC_WRITE_MASK;
> +		access &= ~ACC_USER_MASK;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * If we converted a user page to a kernel page,
> +		 * so that the kernel can write to it when cr0.wp=0,
> +		 * then we should prevent the kernel from executing it
> +		 * if SMEP is enabled.
> +		 */
> +		if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP))
> +			access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
> +	}
> +
> +	if ((access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) &&
> +		  gfn_need_write_protect(vcpu, sptep, level, gfn, can_unsync)) {
> +		access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
> +		ret = true;
> +	}
> +
> +	*pte_access = access;
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
>  static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>  		    unsigned pte_access, int user_fault,
>  		    int write_fault, int level,
> @@ -2341,6 +2398,9 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>  	if (set_mmio_spte(sptep, gfn, pfn, pte_access))
>  		return 0;
> 
> +	ret = vcpu_adjust_access(vcpu, sptep, &pte_access, user_fault,
> +		      write_fault, level, gfn, can_unsync, host_writable);
> +
>  	spte = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
>  	if (!speculative)
>  		spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
> @@ -2353,61 +2413,26 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>  	if (pte_access & ACC_USER_MASK)
>  		spte |= shadow_user_mask;
> 
> +	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) {
> +		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
> +		spte |= SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE;
> +	}
> +
>  	if (level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL)
>  		spte |= PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK;
> +
>  	if (tdp_enabled)
>  		spte |= kvm_x86_ops->get_mt_mask(vcpu, gfn,
>  			kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn));
> 
>  	if (host_writable)
>  		spte |= SPTE_HOST_WRITEABLE;
> -	else
> -		pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
> 
>  	spte |= (u64)pfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
> 
> -	if ((pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
> -	    || (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map && write_fault
> -		&& !is_write_protection(vcpu) && !user_fault)) {
> -		spte |= PT_WRITABLE_MASK | SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE;
> -
> -		if (!vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map
> -		    && !(pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)) {
> -			spte &= ~PT_USER_MASK;
> -			/*
> -			 * If we converted a user page to a kernel page,
> -			 * so that the kernel can write to it when cr0.wp=0,
> -			 * then we should prevent the kernel from executing it
> -			 * if SMEP is enabled.
> -			 */
> -			if (kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP))
> -				spte |= PT64_NX_MASK;
> -		}
> -
> -		/*
> -		 * Optimization: for pte sync, if spte was writable the hash
> -		 * lookup is unnecessary (and expensive). Write protection
> -		 * is responsibility of mmu_get_page / kvm_sync_page.
> -		 * Same reasoning can be applied to dirty page accounting.
> -		 */
> -		if (!can_unsync && is_writable_pte(*sptep))
> -			goto set_pte;
> -
> -		if ((level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
> -		   has_wrprotected_page(vcpu->kvm, gfn, level)) ||
> -		      mmu_need_write_protect(vcpu, gfn, can_unsync)) {
> -			pgprintk("%s: found shadow page for %llx, marking ro\n",
> -				 __func__, gfn);
> -			ret = 1;
> -			pte_access &= ~ACC_WRITE_MASK;
> -			spte &= ~(PT_WRITABLE_MASK | SPTE_MMU_WRITEABLE);
> -		}
> -	}
> -
> -	if (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)
> +	if (is_writable_pte(spte))
>  		mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
> 
> -set_pte:
>  	if (mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte))
>  		kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
>  	return ret;
> -- 
> 1.7.7.6
> 
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