RE: [PATCH v4] KVM: x86: Implement PCID/INVPCID for guests with EPT

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Avi Kivity [mailto:avi@xxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Thursday, June 28, 2012 11:49 PM
> To: Mao, Junjie
> Cc: 'kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] KVM: x86: Implement PCID/INVPCID for guests with
> EPT
> 
> On 06/14/2012 05:04 AM, Mao, Junjie wrote:
> > This patch handles PCID/INVPCID for guests.
> >
> > Process-context identifiers (PCIDs) are a facility by which a logical
> > processor may cache information for multiple linear-address spaces so
> > that the processor may retain cached information when software
> > switches to a different linear address space. Refer to section 4.10.1
> > in IA32 Intel Software Developer's Manual Volume 3A for details.
> >
> > For guests with EPT, the PCID feature is enabled and INVPCID behaves
> > as running natively.
> > For guests without EPT, the PCID feature is disabled and INVPCID triggers
> #UD.
> >
> >
> >  #endif
> >  	unsigned f_rdtscp = kvm_x86_ops->rdtscp_supported() ? F(RDTSCP) : 0;
> > +	unsigned f_pcid = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID) ? F(PCID) : 0;
> 
> Unneeded, just put F(PCID) below.

Understood. Thanks for your suggestion.

> 
> > +	unsigned f_invpcid = kvm_x86_ops->invpcid_supported() ? F(INVPCID) :
> > +0;
> >
> >  	/* cpuid 1.edx */
> >  	const u32 kvm_supported_word0_x86_features = @@ -228,7 +230,7 @@
> > static int do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
> >  		0 /* DS-CPL, VMX, SMX, EST */ |
> >  		0 /* TM2 */ | F(SSSE3) | 0 /* CNXT-ID */ | 0 /* Reserved */ |
> >  		F(FMA) | F(CX16) | 0 /* xTPR Update, PDCM */ |
> > -		0 /* Reserved, DCA */ | F(XMM4_1) |
> > +		f_pcid | 0 /* Reserved, DCA */ | F(XMM4_1) |
> 
> 
> > @@ -1739,6 +1745,11 @@ static bool vmx_rdtscp_supported(void)
> >  	return cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp();
> >  }
> >
> > +static bool vmx_invpcid_supported(void) {
> > +	return cpu_has_vmx_invpcid();
> 
> Should that have && ept_enabled?  You turn off invpcid below if !ept_enabled.
> 
> > +}
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Swap MSR entry in host/guest MSR entry array.
> >   */
> > @@ -2458,7 +2469,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct
> vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
> >  			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |
> >  			SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |
> >  			SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING |
> > -			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
> > +			SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
> > +			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> >  		if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
> >  					MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
> >  					&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0) @@ -3731,6
> +3743,8 @@ static
> > u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
> >  	if (!enable_ept) {
> >  		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
> >  		enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
> > +		/* Enable INVPCID for non-ept guests may cause performance
> regression. */
> > +		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> >  	}
> >  	if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
> >  		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
> 
> This code is unneeded..
> 
> > @@ -6467,6 +6481,23 @@ static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu
> *vcpu)
> >  			}
> >  		}
> >  	}
> > +
> > +	if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) {
> > +		exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> > +		/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
> > +		best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
> > +		if (best && (best->ecx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) &&
> guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu)) {
> > +			exec_control |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> > +			vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> > +				     exec_control);
> > +		} else {
> > +			exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> > +			vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> > +				     exec_control);
> > +			if (best)
> > +				best->ecx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
> > +		}
> > +	}
> >  }
> 
> Since you override it here anyway.  But maybe it's needed if the host never
> calls KVM_SET_CPUID.

The code in vmx_secondary_exec_control may be a must in the situation you have mentioned. The missing of enable_ept in vmx_invpcid_supported will make the guest think it can enable INVPCID support, though it actually does not, when the platform supports it but enable_ept is not set. I'll fix that in the next version.

> 
> >
> >  static void vmx_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2
> > *entry) @@ -6610,6 +6641,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct
> kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
> >  				  page_to_phys(vmx->nested.apic_access_page));
> >  		}
> >
> > +		/* Explicitly disable INVPCID until PCID for L2 guest is supported */
> > +		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
> > +
> 
> We can't just disable it without the guest knowing.  If we don't expose
> INCPCID through the MSR, then we should fail VMKLAUNCH or VMRESUME is
> this bit is set.

I think this means I can replace the code here with a check in nested_vmx_run. Do I understand correctly?

> 
> >  		vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
> >  	}
> >
> > @@ -528,6 +528,10 @@ int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned
> long cr0)
> >  			return 1;
> >  	}
> >
> > +	if ((old_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
> > +	    kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE))
> > +		return 1;
> 
> Why check old_cr0?

MOV to CR0 causes a general-protection exception if it would clear CR0.PG to 0 while CR4.PCIDE = 1. This check reflects the restriction.

> 
> >
> > +	if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && !(old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)) {
> > +		if (!guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu))
> > +			return 1;
> > +
> > +		/* PCID can not be enabled when cr3[11:0]!=000H or EFER.LMA=0 */
> > +		if ((kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_PCID_MASK)
> || !is_long_mode(vcpu))
> > +			return 1;
> > +	}
> > +
> >  	if (kvm_x86_ops->set_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
> >  		return 1;
> >
> > -	if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits)
> > +	if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits) ||
> > +	    (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
> >  		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
> 
> 
> You can do
> 
> 
>   if ((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & (pdptr_bits | X86_CR4_PCIDE))
>      ...

TLB is not invalidated when CR4.PCIDE is changed from 0 to 1. 

> 
> > @@ -626,8 +640,12 @@ int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned
> long cr3)
> >  	}
> >
> >  	if (is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
> > -		if (cr3 & CR3_L_MODE_RESERVED_BITS)
> > -			return 1;
> > +		if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_PCIDE) {
> > +			if (cr3 & CR3_PCID_ENABLED_RESERVED_BITS)
> > +				return 1;
> > +		} else
> > +			if (cr3 & CR3_L_MODE_RESERVED_BITS)
> > +				return 1;
> >  	} else {
> >  		if (is_pae(vcpu)) {
> >  			if (cr3 & CR3_PAE_RESERVED_BITS)
> 
> I'm worried about the order of writes in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs().
> We might end up in a situation where we we can't load all registers due to all
> those checks.
> 

The check here requires that cr4 has been updated already. I'm not sure if it is so in the ioctl.

> 
> --
> error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
> 

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