Re: [PATCH 17/27] nVMX: Implement VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



 On 10/17/2010 12:12 PM, Nadav Har'El wrote:
Implement the VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME instructions, allowing a guest
hypervisor to run its own guests.

Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El<nyh@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |  221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 218 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- .before/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2010-10-17 11:52:02.000000000 +0200
+++ .after/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2010-10-17 11:52:02.000000000 +0200
@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
  	struct vmcs_fields fields;

  	bool launch_state; /* set to 0 by VMCLEAR, to 1 by VMLAUNCH */
+
+	int cpu;

Why is this needed?

+	int launched;

Doesn't it duplicate launch_state?

If I asked these before, it may indicate a comment is needed.

  };

  /*
@@ -315,6 +318,23 @@ struct nested_vmx {
  	/* list of real (hardware) VMCS, one for each L2 guest of L1 */
  	struct list_head vmcs02_list; /* a vmcs_list */
  	int vmcs02_num;
+
+	/* Are we running a nested guest now */
+	bool nested_mode;

TODO: live migration for this state.

+	/* Level 1 state for switching to level 2 and back */
+	struct  {
+		u64 efer;

Redundant? LMA/LME set but IA32E_MODE_GUEST, the other bits unchanged by transition.

+		unsigned long cr3;
+		unsigned long cr4;

Redundant with L1's HOST_CRx?

+		u64 io_bitmap_a;
+		u64 io_bitmap_b;

Unneeded? Should not ever change.

+		u64 msr_bitmap;

Update using setup_msrs().

+		int cpu;
+		int launched;

Hmm.

+	} l1_state;
+	/* Saving the VMCS that we used for running L1 */
+	struct vmcs *vmcs01;
+	struct vmcs_fields *vmcs01_fields;

vmcs01_fields unneeded if we can restructure according to my comments to the previous patch.

  };

  struct vcpu_vmx {
@@ -1349,6 +1369,16 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp

  		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
  		vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
+
+		if (vmx->nested.vmcs01_fields != NULL) {
+			struct vmcs_fields *vmcs01 = vmx->nested.vmcs01_fields;
+			vmcs01->host_tr_base = vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE);
+			vmcs01->host_gdtr_base = vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE);
+			vmcs01->host_ia32_sysenter_esp =
+				vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP);
+			if (vmx->nested.nested_mode)
+				load_vmcs_host_state(vmcs01);
+		}
  	}
  }

Instead, you can call a subset of vmx_vcpu_load() which updates these fields on nested vmexit. In fact I think calling vmx_vcpu_load() as is may work.

Same for nested vmentry. Once you switch the vmcs, call vmx_vcpu_load() and it will update the per-cpu parts of vmcs02.

It will also update per_cpu(current_vmcs) and per_cpu(vcpus_on_vcpu) which are needed for smp and for suspend/resume. You'll also need to call vmx_vcpu_put() (but without the __vmx_load_host_state() part).

+
+static int handle_launch_or_resume(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
+{
+	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* yet another strange pre-requisite listed in the VMX spec */
+	if (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)&  GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS){
+		nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
+			VMXERR_ENTRY_EVENTS_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
+		skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		return 1;
+	}

Can't you just let the guest launch and handle the failure if it happens?

Can be done later; just add a TODO.

+
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_vmcs12->launch_state == launch) {
+		/* Must use VMLAUNCH for the first time, VMRESUME later */
+		nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
+			launch ? VMXERR_VMLAUNCH_NONCLEAR_VMCS :
+				 VMXERR_VMRESUME_NONLAUNCHED_VMCS);
+		skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+		return 1;
+	}

Ditto.  Less critical since it doesn't involve a VMREAD.

+
+	skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+
+	nested_vmx_run(vcpu);
+	return 1;
+}
+

+
+static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	vmx->nested.nested_mode = true;
+	sync_cached_regs_to_vmcs(vcpu);
+	save_vmcs(vmx->nested.vmcs01_fields);
+
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
+	if (!enable_ept)
+		vmx->nested.l1_state.cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;
+
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
+		vmx->nested.l1_state.msr_bitmap = vmcs_read64(MSR_BITMAP);
+	else
+		vmx->nested.l1_state.msr_bitmap = 0;
+
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.io_bitmap_a = vmcs_read64(IO_BITMAP_A);
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.io_bitmap_b = vmcs_read64(IO_BITMAP_B);
+	vmx->nested.vmcs01 = vmx->vmcs;
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.cpu = vcpu->cpu;
+	vmx->nested.l1_state.launched = vmx->launched;
+
+	vmx->vmcs = nested_get_current_vmcs(vcpu);
+	if (!vmx->vmcs) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "Missing VMCS\n");

Guest exploitable printk(), remove. There are debug printk macros around, you can use them if they help debugging.

+		nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_VMRESUME_CORRUPTED_VMCS);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	vcpu->cpu = vmx->nested.current_vmcs12->cpu;
+	vmx->launched = vmx->nested.current_vmcs12->launched;

These bits are volatile (changed by process migration) so can only be used in preempt disabled contexts.


+
+	if (!vmx->nested.current_vmcs12->launch_state || !vmx->launched) {
+		vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs);
+		vmx->launched = 0;
+		vmx->nested.current_vmcs12->launch_state = 1;

launch_state == 1 -> not launched?  strange.

vmcs_clear() needs to happen on the right cpu.

+	}
+
+	vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, get_cpu());

Does this not do everything correctly?

I think you need to move the get_cpu() above to disable preemption. Not sure how much.
+	put_cpu();
+
+	prepare_vmcs02(vcpu,
+		get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu), vmx->nested.vmcs01_fields);
+
+	if (get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->vm_entry_controls&
+	    VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) {
+		if (!((vcpu->arch.efer&  EFER_LMA)&&
+		      (vcpu->arch.efer&  EFER_LME)))

+			vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
+	} else {
+		if ((vcpu->arch.efer&  EFER_LMA) ||
+		    (vcpu->arch.efer&  EFER_LME))
+			vcpu->arch.efer = 0;

Clearing all of EFER is incorrect. Just assign IA32E_MODE unconditionally to both EFER.LMA and EFER.LME.

+	}
+
+	vmx->rmode.vm86_active =
+		!(get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->cr0_read_shadow&  X86_CR0_PE);

Needs to be unconditionally false since we don't support real mode nested guests. No need to clear since we can't vmenter from a real mode guest.

+
+	/* vmx_set_cr0() sets the cr0 that L2 will read, to be the one that L1
+	 * dictated, and takes appropriate actions for special cr0 bits (like
+	 * real mode, etc.).
+	 */
+	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, guest_readable_cr0(get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)));

Don't we want vmcs12->guest_cr0 here? guest_readable_cr0() is only useful for lmsw and emulated_read_cr().

Paging mode etc. are set by guest_cr0; consider cr0_read_shadow.pg=0 and guest_cr0.pg=1.

+
+	/* However, vmx_set_cr0 incorrectly enforces KVM's relationship between
+	 * GUEST_CR0 and CR0_READ_SHADOW, e.g., that the former is the same as
+	 * the latter with with TS added if !fpu_active. We need to take the
+	 * actual GUEST_CR0 that L1 wanted, just with added TS if !fpu_active
+	 * like KVM wants (for the "lazy fpu" feature, to avoid the costly
+	 * restoration of fpu registers until the FPU is really used).
+	 */
+	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->guest_cr0 |
+		(vcpu->fpu_active ? 0 : X86_CR0_TS));

See?

+
+	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->guest_cr4);
+	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW,
+		    get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->cr4_read_shadow);
+
+	/* we have to set the X86_CR0_PG bit of the cached cr0, because
+	 * kvm_mmu_reset_context enables paging only if X86_CR0_PG is set in
+	 * CR0 (we need the paging so that KVM treat this guest as a paging
+	 * guest so we can easly forward page faults to L1.)
+	 */
+	vcpu->arch.cr0 |= X86_CR0_PG;

Shouldn't be needed (but should check that guest_cr0 has the always-on bits set).

+
+	if (enable_ept) {
+		vmcs_write32(GUEST_CR3, get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->guest_cr3);
+		vmx->vcpu.arch.cr3 = get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->guest_cr3;
+	} else {
+		int r;
+		kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, get_vmcs12_fields(vcpu)->guest_cr3);
+		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
+
+		r = kvm_mmu_load(vcpu);
+		if (unlikely(r)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "Error in kvm_mmu_load r %d\n", r);
+			nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
+				VMXERR_VMRESUME_CORRUPTED_VMCS /* ? */);
+			/* switch back to L1 */
+			vmx->nested.nested_mode = false;
+			vmx->vmcs = vmx->nested.vmcs01;
+			vcpu->cpu = vmx->nested.l1_state.cpu;
+			vmx->launched = vmx->nested.l1_state.launched;
+
+			vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, get_cpu());
+			put_cpu();
+
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}

I think you can call kvm_set_cr3() unconditionally. It will return 1 on bad cr3 which you can use for failing the entry.

btw, kvm_mmu_reset_context() is needed on ept as well; kvm_mmu_load() is not needed AFAICT (the common entry code will take care of it).


--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html


[Index of Archives]     [KVM ARM]     [KVM ia64]     [KVM ppc]     [Virtualization Tools]     [Spice Development]     [Libvirt]     [Libvirt Users]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Questions]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]
  Powered by Linux