Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR index

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On Fri, 14 Feb 2025 17:14:32 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Harden KVM against goofy userspace by restricting the Xen hypercall MSR
> index to the de facto standard synthetic range, 0x40000000 - 0x4fffffff.
> This obviously has the potential to break userspace, but I'm fairly confident
> it'll be fine (knock wood), and doing nothing is not an option as letting
> userspace redirect any WRMSR is at best completely broken.
> 
> Patches 2-5 are tangentially related cleanups.
> 
> [...]

Applied to kvm-x86 xen, with the docs change.  Thanks for the reviews!

[1/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR to unofficial synthetic range
      https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/5c17848134ab
[2/5] KVM: x86/xen: Add an #ifdef'd helper to detect writes to Xen MSR
      https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/bb0978d95a55
[3/5] KVM: x86/xen: Consult kvm_xen_enabled when checking for Xen MSR writes
      https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/a5d7700af6b0
[4/5] KVM: x86/xen: Bury xen_hvm_config behind CONFIG_KVM_XEN=y
      https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/69e5a7dde965
[5/5] KVM: x86/xen: Move kvm_xen_hvm_config field into kvm_xen
      https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/26e228ec1695

--
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/tree/next




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