On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
On exiting from the guest TD, xsave state is clobbered. Restore xsave
state on TD exit.
Set up guest state so that existing kvm_load_host_xsave_state() can be
used. Do not allow VCPU entry if guest state conflicts with the TD's
configuration.
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@xxxxxxxxx>
---
TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
- Drop PT and CET feature flags (Chao)
- Use cpu_feature_enabled() instead of static_cpu_has() (Chao)
- Restore PKRU only if the host value differs from defined
exit value (Chao)
- Use defined masks to separate XFAM bits into XCR0/XSS (Adrian)
- Use existing kvm_load_host_xsave_state() in place of
tdx_restore_host_xsave_state() by defining guest CR4, XCR0, XSS
and PKRU (Sean)
- Do not enter if vital guest state is invalid (Adrian)
TD vcpu enter/exit v1:
- Remove noinstr on tdx_vcpu_enter_exit() (Sean)
- Switch to kvm_host struct for xcr0 and xss
v19:
- Add EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_xcr0)
v15 -> v16:
- Added CET flag mask
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 3f3d61935a58..e4355553569a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -83,16 +83,21 @@ static u64 tdx_get_supported_attrs(const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf)
return val;
}
+/*
+ * Before returning from TDH.VP.ENTER, the TDX Module assigns:
+ * XCR0 to the TD’s user-mode feature bits of XFAM (bits 7:0, 9, 18:17)
+ * IA32_XSS to the TD's supervisor-mode feature bits of XFAM (bits 8, 16:10)
+ */
+#define TDX_XFAM_XCR0_MASK (GENMASK(7, 0) | BIT(9) | GENMASK(18, 17))
+#define TDX_XFAM_XSS_MASK (BIT(8) | GENMASK(16, 10))
+#define TDX_XFAM_MASK (TDX_XFAM_XCR0_MASK | TDX_XFAM_XSS_MASK)
No need to define TDX-specific mask for XFAM. kernel defines
XFEATURE_MASK_* and you can define XFEATURE_XCR0_MASK and
XFEATURE_XSS_MASK with XFEATURE_MASK_*.
static u64 tdx_get_supported_xfam(const struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf *td_conf)
{
u64 val = kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 | kvm_caps.supported_xss;
- /*
- * PT and CET can be exposed to TD guest regardless of KVM's XSS, PT
- * and, CET support.
- */
- val |= XFEATURE_MASK_PT | XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER |
- XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL;
+ /* Ensure features are in the masks */
+ val &= TDX_XFAM_MASK;
It's unncessary.
kvm_caps.supported_xcr0 | kvm_caps.supported_xss must be the subset of
TDX_XFAM_MASK;
if ((val & td_conf->xfam_fixed1) != td_conf->xfam_fixed1)
return 0;
@@ -724,6 +729,19 @@ int tdx_vcpu_pre_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
+static bool tdx_guest_state_is_invalid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
+
+ return vcpu->arch.xcr0 != (kvm_tdx->xfam & TDX_XFAM_XCR0_MASK) ||
+ vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != (kvm_tdx->xfam & TDX_XFAM_XSS_MASK) ||
+ vcpu->arch.pkru ||
+ (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
+ !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) ||
+ (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES) &&
+ !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES));
guest_cpu_cap_has() is better to put into the path when userspace
configures the vcpu model. So that KVM can return error to userspace
earlier before running the vcpu.
> +}> +
static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
@@ -740,6 +758,8 @@ static noinstr void tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
{
+ struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
+
/*
* force_immediate_exit requires vCPU entering for events injection with
* an immediately exit followed. But The TDX module doesn't guarantee
@@ -750,10 +770,22 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool force_immediate_exit)
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(force_immediate_exit);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(tdx_guest_state_is_invalid(vcpu))) {
+ /*
+ * Invalid exit_reason becomes KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR, refer
+ * tdx_handle_exit().
+ */
+ tdx->vt.exit_reason.full = -1u;
+ tdx->vp_enter_ret = -1u;
+ return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE;
+ }
+
trace_kvm_entry(vcpu, force_immediate_exit);
tdx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu);
+ kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
+
vcpu->arch.regs_avail &= ~TDX_REGS_UNSUPPORTED_SET;
trace_kvm_exit(vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
@@ -1878,9 +1910,23 @@ static int tdx_vcpu_get_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
return r;
}
+static u64 tdx_guest_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 cr4)
+{
+ u64 cr0 = ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS;
+
+ if (cr4 & X86_CR4_CET)
+ cr0 |= X86_CR0_WP;
+
+ cr0 |= X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_NE;
+ cr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD);
+
+ return cr0;
+}
+
static int tdx_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
{
u64 apic_base;
+ struct kvm_tdx *kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(vcpu->kvm);
struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu);
int ret;
@@ -1903,6 +1949,20 @@ static int tdx_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tdx_cmd *cmd)
if (ret)
return ret;
+ vcpu->arch.cr4 = ~vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits;
when userspace doesn't configure XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU in XFAM, it seems
kvm_load_host_xsave_state() will skip restore host's PKRU value.
Besides, vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_rsvd_bits depends on KVM_SET_CPUID*, we
need enfore the dependency that tdx_vcpu_init() needs to be called after
vcpu model is configured.
+ vcpu->arch.cr0 = tdx_guest_cr0(vcpu, vcpu->arch.cr4);
+ /*
+ * On return from VP.ENTER, the TDX Module sets XCR0 and XSS to the
+ * maximal values supported by the guest, and zeroes PKRU, so from
+ * KVM's perspective, those are the guest's values at all times.
+ */
It's better to also call out that this is only to make
kvm_load_host_xsave_state() work for TDX. They don't represent the real
guest value.
+ vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = kvm_tdx->xfam & TDX_XFAM_XSS_MASK;
+ vcpu->arch.xcr0 = kvm_tdx->xfam & TDX_XFAM_XCR0_MASK;
+ vcpu->arch.pkru = 0;
+
+ /* TODO: freeze vCPU model before kvm_update_cpuid_runtime() */
+ kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
+
tdx->state = VCPU_TD_STATE_INITIALIZED;
return 0;
