Re: [PATCH 16/24] Implement VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME

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On Sun, Jun 13, 2010 at 03:30:46PM +0300, Nadav Har'El wrote:
> Implement the VMLAUNCH and VMRESUME instructions, allowing a guest
> hypervisor to run its own guests.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> --- .before/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2010-06-13 15:01:29.000000000 +0300
> +++ .after/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c	2010-06-13 15:01:29.000000000 +0300
> @@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcs
>  	struct shadow_vmcs shadow_vmcs;
>  
>  	bool launch_state; /* set to 0 by VMCLEAR, to 1 by VMLAUNCH */
> +
> +	int cpu;
> +	int launched;
>  };
>  
>  struct vmcs_list {
> @@ -297,6 +300,24 @@ struct nested_vmx {
>  	/* list of real (hardware) VMCS, one for each L2 guest of L1 */
>  	struct list_head l2_vmcs_list; /* a vmcs_list */
>  	int l2_vmcs_num;
> +
> +	/* Are we running a nested guest now */
> +	bool nested_mode;
> +	/* Level 1 state for switching to level 2 and back */
> +	struct  {
> +		u64 efer;
> +		unsigned long cr3;
> +		unsigned long cr4;
> +		u64 io_bitmap_a;
> +		u64 io_bitmap_b;
> +		u64 msr_bitmap;
> +		int cpu;
> +		int launched;
> +	} l1_state;
> +	/* Level 1 shadow vmcs for switching to level 2 and back */
> +	struct shadow_vmcs *l1_shadow_vmcs;
> +	/* Level 1 vmcs loaded into the processor */
> +	struct vmcs *l1_vmcs;
>  };
>  
>  enum vmcs_field_type {
> @@ -1407,6 +1428,19 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp
>  			new_offset = vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET) + delta;
>  			vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, new_offset);
>  		}
> +
> +		if (vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs != NULL) {
> +			struct shadow_vmcs *l1svmcs =
> +				vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs;
> +			l1svmcs->host_tr_base = vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE);
> +			l1svmcs->host_gdtr_base = vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE);
> +			l1svmcs->host_ia32_sysenter_esp =
> +				vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP);
> +			if (tsc_this < vcpu->arch.host_tsc)
> +				l1svmcs->tsc_offset = vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET);
> +			if (vmx->nested.nested_mode)
> +				load_vmcs_host_state(l1svmcs);
> +		}
>  	}
>  }
>  
> @@ -2301,6 +2335,9 @@ static void free_l1_state(struct kvm_vcp
>  		kfree(list_item);
>  	}
>  	vmx->nested.l2_vmcs_num = 0;
> +
> +	kfree(vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs);
> +	vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs = NULL;
>  }
>  
>  static void free_kvm_area(void)
> @@ -4158,6 +4195,13 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *
>  	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(vmx->nested.l2_vmcs_list));
>  	vmx->nested.l2_vmcs_num = 0;
>  
> +	vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs) {
> +		printk(KERN_INFO
> +			"couldn't allocate memory for l1_shadow_vmcs\n");
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
> +
>  	vmx->nested.vmxon = 1;
>  
>  	skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
> @@ -4348,6 +4392,42 @@ static int handle_vmclear(struct kvm_vcp
>  	return 1;
>  }
>  
> +static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +
> +static int handle_launch_or_resume(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
> +{
> +	if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	if (!nested_map_current(vcpu))
> +		return 1;
> +	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.current_l2_page->launch_state == launch) {
> +		/* Must use VMLAUNCH for the first time, VMRESUME later */
> +		set_rflags_to_vmx_fail_valid(vcpu);
> +		nested_unmap_current(vcpu);
> +		return 1;
> +	}
Should also check MOV SS blocking. Why Intel decided that vm entry
should fail in this case? How knows, but spec says so.

> +	nested_unmap_current(vcpu);
> +
> +	skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
> +
> +	nested_vmx_run(vcpu);
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
> +/* Emulate the VMLAUNCH instruction */
> +static int handle_vmlaunch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	return handle_launch_or_resume(vcpu, true);
> +}
> +
> +/* Emulate the VMRESUME instruction */
> +static int handle_vmresume(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +
> +	return handle_launch_or_resume(vcpu, false);
> +}
> +
>  static inline bool nested_vmcs_read_any(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  					unsigned long field, u64 *ret)
>  {
> @@ -4892,11 +4972,11 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(st
>  	[EXIT_REASON_INVLPG]		      = handle_invlpg,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMCALL]                  = handle_vmcall,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR]	              = handle_vmclear,
> -	[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]                = handle_vmx_insn,
> +	[EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH]                = handle_vmlaunch,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD]                 = handle_vmptrld,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST]                 = handle_vmptrst,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMREAD]                  = handle_vmread,
> -	[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]                = handle_vmx_insn,
> +	[EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME]                = handle_vmresume,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE]                 = handle_vmwrite,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMOFF]                   = handle_vmoff,
>  	[EXIT_REASON_VMON]                    = handle_vmon,
> @@ -4958,7 +5038,8 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vc
>  		       "(0x%x) and exit reason is 0x%x\n",
>  		       __func__, vectoring_info, exit_reason);
>  
> -	if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
> +	if (!vmx->nested.nested_mode &&
> +		unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
>  		if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
>  			vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
>  		} else if (vmx->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
> @@ -5771,6 +5852,138 @@ int prepare_vmcs_02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcp
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
> +
> +	vmx->nested.nested_mode = 1;
> +	sync_cached_regs_to_vmcs(vcpu);
> +	save_vmcs(vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs);
> +
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.efer = vcpu->arch.efer;
> +	if (!enable_ept)
> +		vmx->nested.l1_state.cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.cr4 = vcpu->arch.cr4;
> +
> +	if (!nested_map_current(vcpu)) {
> +		set_rflags_to_vmx_fail_valid(vcpu);
> +		return 1;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
> +		vmx->nested.l1_state.msr_bitmap = vmcs_read64(MSR_BITMAP);
> +	else
> +		vmx->nested.l1_state.msr_bitmap = 0;
> +
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.io_bitmap_a = vmcs_read64(IO_BITMAP_A);
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.io_bitmap_b = vmcs_read64(IO_BITMAP_B);
> +	vmx->nested.l1_vmcs = vmx->vmcs;
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.cpu = vcpu->cpu;
> +	vmx->nested.l1_state.launched = vmx->launched;
> +
> +	vmx->vmcs = nested_get_current_vmcs(vcpu);
> +	if (!vmx->vmcs) {
> +		printk(KERN_ERR "Missing VMCS\n");
> +		set_rflags_to_vmx_fail_valid(vcpu);
> +		return 1;
> +	}
> +
> +	vcpu->cpu = vmx->nested.current_l2_page->cpu;
> +	vmx->launched = vmx->nested.current_l2_page->launched;
> +
> +	if (!vmx->nested.current_l2_page->launch_state || !vmx->launched) {
> +		vmcs_clear(vmx->vmcs);
> +		vmx->launched = 0;
> +		vmx->nested.current_l2_page->launch_state = 1;
> +	}
> +
> +	vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, get_cpu());
> +	put_cpu();
> +
> +	prepare_vmcs_02(vcpu,
> +		get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu), vmx->nested.l1_shadow_vmcs);
> +
> +	if (get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->vm_entry_controls &
> +	    VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) {
> +		if (!((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA) &&
> +		      (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME)))
> +			vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
> +	} else {
> +		if ((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LMA) ||
> +		    (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME))
> +			vcpu->arch.efer = 0;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* vmx_set_cr0() sets the cr0 that L2 will read, to be the one that L1
> +	 * dictated, and takes appropriate actions for special cr0 bits (like
> +	 * real mode, etc.).
> +	 */
> +	vmx_set_cr0(vcpu,
> +		(get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr0 &
> +			~get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
> +		(get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->cr0_read_shadow &
> +			get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->cr0_guest_host_mask));
> +
> +	/* However, vmx_set_cr0 incorrectly enforces KVM's relationship between
> +	 * GUEST_CR0 and CR0_READ_SHADOW, e.g., that the former is the same as
> +	 * the latter with with TS added if !fpu_active. We need to take the
> +	 * actual GUEST_CR0 that L1 wanted, just with added TS if !fpu_active
> +	 * like KVM wants (for the "lazy fpu" feature, to avoid the costly
> +	 * restoration of fpu registers until the FPU is really used).
> +	 */
> +	vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr0 |
> +		(vcpu->fpu_active ? 0 : X86_CR0_TS));
> +
> +	vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr4);
> +	vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW,
> +		    get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->cr4_read_shadow);
> +
> +	/* we have to set the X86_CR0_PG bit of the cached cr0, because
> +	 * kvm_mmu_reset_context enables paging only if X86_CR0_PG is set in
> +	 * CR0 (we need the paging so that KVM treat this guest as a paging
> +	 * guest so we can easly forward page faults to L1.)
> +	 */
> +	vcpu->arch.cr0 |= X86_CR0_PG;
> +
> +	if (enable_ept && !nested_cpu_has_vmx_ept(vcpu)) {
> +		vmcs_write32(GUEST_CR3, get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr3);
> +		vmx->vcpu.arch.cr3 = get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr3;
> +	} else {
> +		int r;
> +		kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_cr3);
> +		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
> +
> +		nested_unmap_current(vcpu);
> +
> +		r = kvm_mmu_load(vcpu);
> +		if (unlikely(r)) {
> +			printk(KERN_ERR "Error in kvm_mmu_load r %d\n", r);
> +			set_rflags_to_vmx_fail_valid(vcpu);
> +			/* switch back to L1 */
> +			vmx->nested.nested_mode = 0;
> +			vmx->vmcs = vmx->nested.l1_vmcs;
> +			vcpu->cpu = vmx->nested.l1_state.cpu;
> +			vmx->launched = vmx->nested.l1_state.launched;
> +
> +			vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, get_cpu());
> +			put_cpu();
> +
> +			return 1;
> +		}
> +
> +		nested_map_current(vcpu);
> +	}
> +
> +	kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP,
> +			   get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_rsp);
> +	kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP,
> +			   get_shadow_vmcs(vcpu)->guest_rip);
> +
> +	nested_unmap_current(vcpu);
> +
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
>  static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops = {
>  	.cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
>  	.disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
> --
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			Gleb.
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