Re: [kvm-unit-tests patch v6 04/18] x86: pmu: Fix the issue that pmu_counter_t.config crosses cache line

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On 2/15/2025 5:05 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 14, 2024, Dapeng Mi wrote:
>> When running pmu test on SPR, the following #GP fault is reported.
>>
>> Unhandled exception 13 #GP at ip 000000000040771f
>> error_code=0000      rflags=00010046      cs=00000008
>> rax=00000000004031ad rcx=0000000000000186 rdx=0000000000000000 rbx=00000000005142f0
>> rbp=0000000000514260 rsi=0000000000000020 rdi=0000000000000340
>>  r8=0000000000513a65  r9=00000000000003f8 r10=000000000000000d r11=00000000ffffffff
>> r12=000000000043003c r13=0000000000514450 r14=000000000000000b r15=0000000000000001
>> cr0=0000000080010011 cr2=0000000000000000 cr3=0000000001007000 cr4=0000000000000020
>> cr8=0000000000000000
>>         STACK: @40771f 40040e 400976 400aef 40148d 401da9 4001ad
>> FAIL pmu
>>
>> It looks EVENTSEL0 MSR (0x186) is written a invalid value (0x4031ad) and
>> cause a #GP.
> Nope.
>
>> Further investigation shows the #GP is caused by below code in
>> __start_event().
>>
>> rmsr(MSR_GP_EVENT_SELECTx(event_to_global_idx(evt)),
>> 		  evt->config | EVNTSEL_EN);
> Nope.
>
>> The evt->config is correctly initialized but seems corrupted before
>> writing to MSR.
> Still nope.
>
>> The original pmu_counter_t layout looks as below.
>>
>> typedef struct {
>> 	uint32_t ctr;
>> 	uint64_t config;
>> 	uint64_t count;
>> 	int idx;
>> } pmu_counter_t;
>>
>> Obviously the config filed crosses two cache lines. 
> Yeah, no.  Cache lines are 64 bytes on x86, and even with the bad layout, the size
> only adds up to 32 bytes on x86-64.  Packing it slightly better drops it to 24
> bytes, but that has nothing to do with cache lines.
>  
>> When the two cache lines are not updated simultaneously, the config value is
>> corrupted.
> This is simply nonsensical.  Compilers don't generate accesses that split cache
> lines unless software is being deliberately stupid, and x86 doesn't corrupt data
> on unaligned accesses.
>
> The actual problem is that your next patch increases the size of the array in
> check_counters_many() from 10 to 48 entries.  With 32 bytes per entry, it's just
> enough to overflow the stack when making function calls (the array itself stays
> on the stack page).  And because KUT's percpu and stack management is complete
> and utter garbage, overflowing the stack clobbers the percpu area.
>
> Of course, it's way too hard to even see that, because all of the code is beyond
> stupid and (a) doesn't align the stacks to 4KiB, and (b) puts the percpu area at
> the bottom of the stack "page".
>
> I'll send patches to put band-aids on the per-CPU insanity, along with a refreshed
> version of this series.

Thumb up! I never realized this issue is caused by stack corruption. I
would review and test the v7 patch set later. Thanks.






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