Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] KVM: s390: pv: fix race when making a page secure

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On 13.02.25 21:16, David Hildenbrand wrote:
On 13.02.25 21:07, Claudio Imbrenda wrote:
Holding the pte lock for the page that is being converted to secure is
needed to avoid races. A previous commit removed the locking, which
caused issues. Fix by locking the pte again.

Fixes: 5cbe24350b7d ("KVM: s390: move pv gmap functions into kvm")

If you found this because of my report about the changed locking,
consider adding a Suggested-by / Reported-y.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
   arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h |  2 +-
   arch/s390/kernel/uv.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
   arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c       | 12 ++++++++----
   3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index b11f5b6d0bd1..46fb0ef6f984 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr);
   int uv_destroy_folio(struct folio *folio);
   int uv_destroy_pte(pte_t pte);
   int uv_convert_from_secure_pte(pte_t pte);
-int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb);
+int make_hva_secure(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb);
   int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr);
   int uv_convert_from_secure_folio(struct folio *folio);
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 9f05df2da2f7..de3c092da7b9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int expected_folio_refs(struct folio *folio)
    * Context: The caller must hold exactly one extra reference on the folio
    *          (it's the same logic as split_folio())
    */
-int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
+static int __make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
   {
   	int expected, cc = 0;
@@ -277,7 +277,22 @@ int make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
   		return -EAGAIN;
   	return uvcb->rc == 0x10a ? -ENXIO : -EINVAL;
   }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_folio_secure);
+
+int make_hva_secure(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long hva, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
+{
+	spinlock_t *ptelock;
+	pte_t *ptep;
+	int rc;
+
+	ptep = get_locked_pte(mm, hva, &ptelock);
+	if (!ptep)
+		return -ENXIO;
+	rc = __make_folio_secure(page_folio(pte_page(*ptep)), hva, uvcb);
+	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(make_hva_secure);
/*
    * To be called with the folio locked or with an extra reference! This will
diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
index fc4d490d25a2..e56c0ab5fec7 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/gmap.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static bool should_export_before_import(struct uv_cb_header *uvcb, struct mm_str
   	return atomic_read(&mm->context.protected_count) > 1;
   }
-static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
+static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, unsigned long hva, void *uvcb)
   {
   	struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
   	int rc;
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
   		return -EAGAIN;
   	if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
   		uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
-	rc = make_folio_secure(folio, uvcb);
+	rc = make_hva_secure(gmap->mm, hva, uvcb);
   	folio_unlock(folio);
/*
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ static int __gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, struct page *page, void *uvcb)
   int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
   {
   	struct kvm *kvm = gmap->private;
+	unsigned long vmaddr;
   	struct page *page;
   	int rc = 0;
@@ -127,8 +128,11 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb) page = gfn_to_page(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr));
   	mmap_read_lock(gmap->mm);
-	if (page)
-		rc = __gmap_make_secure(gmap, page, uvcb);
+	vmaddr = gfn_to_hva(gmap->private, gpa_to_gfn(gaddr));
+	if (kvm_is_error_hva(vmaddr))
+		rc = -ENXIO;
+	if (!rc && page)
+		rc = __gmap_make_secure(gmap, page, vmaddr, uvcb);
   	kvm_release_page_clean(page);
   	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);

You effectively make the code more complicated and inefficient than
before. Now you effectively walk the page table twice in the common
small-folio case ...

Can we just go back to the old handling that we had before here?

I'll note that there is still the possibility for a different race: nothing guarantees that the page you looked up using gfn_to_hva() will still be mapped when you perform the get_locked_pte(). Not sure what would happen if we would have a different page mapped.

You could re-verify it is still there, but then, doing two page table walks is still more than required in the common case where we can just perform the conversion.

--
Cheers,

David / dhildenb





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