On 11/29/24 06:39, Nikita Kalyazin wrote:
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM) && !defined(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)
Another option is to use the confidential computing (coco) attributes to keep
the write operation limited to clear-text guests (diff against patch 1/2):
There are a couple of benefits and shortcomings that I've listed below the diff.
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 9aba0ba25276..b7a0c7f2f82d 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
#include <linux/falloc.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
@@ -274,7 +275,14 @@ static struct folio *kvm_gmem_get_folio(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
return filemap_grab_folio(inode->i_mapping, index);
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM) && !defined(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)
+static bool kvm_has_cc(void)
+{
+ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM)
static ssize_t kvm_kmem_gmem_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
@@ -290,6 +298,9 @@ static ssize_t kvm_kmem_gmem_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (!buf)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (kvm_has_cc())
+ return -EIO;
+
start = *offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
end = (*offset + count) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -564,7 +575,7 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
}
static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = {
-#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM) && !defined(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM)
.llseek = default_llseek,
.write = kvm_kmem_gmem_write,
#endif
Advantages:
* works with multiple architectures (powerpc and x86 so far)
* enumerates specific types of coco attributes
Disadvantages:
* The platform can have an encryption attribute but still be running a guest in clear text
* Some guests could be encrypted while others are clear text
To remedy the disadvantage, the write function would need to check if guest encryption is
currently active for a specific guest.
Mike
+static ssize_t kvm_kmem_gmem_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *offset)
+{
+ pgoff_t start, end, index;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
