Re: [PATCH v2 8/8] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Support IOMMU_DOMAIN_NESTED

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On Fri, Sep 06, 2024 at 10:34:44AM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 06, 2024 at 11:07:47AM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote:
> 
> > However, I believe the UAPI can be more clear and solid in terms of
> > what is supported (maybe a typical struct with the CD, and some
> > extra configs?) I will give it a think.
> 
> I don't think breaking up the STE into fields in another struct is
> going to be a big improvement, it adds more code and corner cases to
> break up and reassemble it.
> 
> #define STRTAB_STE_0_NESTING_ALLOWED                                         \
> 	cpu_to_le64(STRTAB_STE_0_V | STRTAB_STE_0_CFG | STRTAB_STE_0_S1FMT | \
> 		    STRTAB_STE_0_S1CTXPTR_MASK | STRTAB_STE_0_S1CDMAX)
> #define STRTAB_STE_1_NESTING_ALLOWED                            \
> 	cpu_to_le64(STRTAB_STE_1_S1DSS | STRTAB_STE_1_S1CIR |   \
> 		    STRTAB_STE_1_S1COR | STRTAB_STE_1_S1CSH |   \
> 		    STRTAB_STE_1_S1STALLD | STRTAB_STE_1_EATS)
> 
> It is 11 fields that would need to be recoded, that's alot.. Even if
> you say the 3 cache ones are not needed it is still alot.

I was thinking of providing a higher level semantics
(no need for caching, valid...), something like:

struct smmu_user_table {
	u64 cd_table;
	u32 smmu_cd_cfg;  /* linear or 2lvl,.... */
	u32 smmu_trans_cfg; /* Translate, bypass, abort */
	u32 dev_feat; /*ATS, STALL, …*/
};

I feel that is a bit more clear for user space? Instead of
partially setting the STE, and it should be easier to extend than
masking the STE.

I’am not opposed to the vSTE, I just feel it's loosely defined,
that's why I was asking for the docs.

> 
> > > Reporting a static kernel capability through GET_INFO output is
> > > easier/saner than providing some kind of policy flags in the GET_INFO
> > > input to specify how the sanitization should work.
> > 
> > I don’t think it’s “policy”, it’s just giving userspace the minimum
> > knowledge it needs to create the vSMMU, but again no really strong
> > opinion about that.
> 
> There is no single "minimum knowledge" though, it depends on what the
> VMM is able to support. IMHO once you go over to the "VMM has to
> ignore bits it doesn't understand" you may as well just show
> everything. Then the kernel side can't be wrong.
> 
> If the kernel side can be wrong, then you are back to handshaking
> policy because the kernel can't assume that all existing VMMs wil not
> rely on the kernel to do the masking.
>

I agree it’s tricky, again no strong opinion on that, although I doubt
that a VMM would care about all the SMMU features.

> > > > But this is a UAPI. How can userspace implement that if it has no
> > > > documentation, and how can it be maintained if there is no clear
> > > > interface with userspace with what is expected/returned...
> > > 
> > > I'm not sure what you are looking for here? I don't think an entire
> > > tutorial on how to build a paravirtualized vSMMU is appropriate to
> > > put in comments?
> > 
> > Sorry, I don’t think I was clear, I meant actual documentation for
> > the UAPI, as in RST files for example. If I want to support that
> > in kvmtool how can I implement it? 
> 
> Well, you need thousands of lines of code in kvtool to build a vIOMMU :)
> 
> Nicolin is looking at writing something, lets see.
> 
> I think for here we should focus on the comments being succinct but
> sufficient to understand what the uAPI does itself.
> 
Actually I think the opposite, I think UAPI docs is more important
here, especially for the vSTE, that's how we can compare the code to
what is expected from user-space.

> > > I would *really* like everyone to sit down and figure out how to
> > > manage virtual device lifecycle in a single language!
> > 
> > Yes, just like the guest_memfd work. There has been also
> > some work to unify some of the guest HVC bits:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240830130150.8568-1-will@xxxxxxxxxx/
> 
> I think Dan Williams is being ringleader for the PCI side effort on CC

Thanks, I will try to spend some time on the secure VFIO work.

Thanks,
Mostafa

> 
> Jason




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