On 3/9/24 15:13, Xu Yilun wrote:
On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 12:22:56PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
On 31/8/24 02:57, Xu Yilun wrote:
On Fri, Aug 23, 2024 at 11:21:27PM +1000, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
Currently private MMIO nested page faults are not expected so when such
fault occurs, KVM tries moving the faulted page from private to shared
which is not going to work as private MMIO is not backed by memfd.
Handle private MMIO as shared: skip page state change and memfd
This means host keeps the mapping for private MMIO, which is different
from private memory. Not sure if it is expected, and I want to get
some directions here.
There is no other translation table on AMD though, the same NPT. The
Sorry for not being clear, when I say "host mapping" I mean host
userspace mapping (host CR3 mapping). By using guest_memfd, there is no
host CR3 mapping for private memory. I'm wondering if we could keep host
CR3 mapping for private MMIO.
>> security is enforced by the RMP table. A device says "bar#x is
private" so
the host + firmware ensure the each corresponding RMP entry is "assigned" +
"validated" and has a correct IDE stream ID and ASID, and the VM's kernel
maps it with the Cbit set.
From HW perspective, private MMIO is not intended to be accessed by
host, but the consequence may varies. According to TDISP spec 11.2,
my understanding is private device (known as TDI) should reject the
TLP and transition to TDISP ERROR state. But no further error
reporting or logging is mandated. So the impact to the host system
is specific to each device. In my test environment, an AER
NonFatalErr is reported and nothing more, much better than host
accessing private memory.
afair I get an non-fatal RMP fault so the device does not even notice.
On SW side, my concern is how to deal with mmu_notifier. In theory, if
we get pfn from hva we should follow the userspace mapping change. But
that makes no sense. Especially for TDX TEE-IO, private MMIO mapping
in SEPT cannot be changed or invalidated as long as TDI is running.
Another concern may be specific for TDX TEE-IO. Allowing both userspace
mapping and SEPT mapping may be safe for private MMIO, but on
KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2, KVM cannot actually tell if a userspace
addr is really for private MMIO. I.e. user could provide shared memory
addr to KVM but declare it is for private MMIO. The shared memory then
could be mapped in SEPT and cause problem.
I am missing lots of context here. When you are starting a guest with a
passed through device, until the TDISP machinery transitions the TDI into
RUN, this TDI's MMIO is shared and mapped everywhere. And after
Yes, that's the situation nowadays. I think if we need to eliminate
host CR3 mapping for private MMIO, a simple way is we don't allow host
CR3 mapping at the first place, even for shared pass through. It is
doable cause:
1. IIUC, host CR3 mapping for assigned MMIO is only used for pfn
finding, i.e. host doesn't really (or shouldn't?) access them.
Well, the host userspace might also want to access MMIO via mmap'ed
region if it is, say, DPDK.
2. The hint from guest_memfd shows KVM doesn't have to rely on host
CR3 mapping to find pfn.
True.
transitioning to RUN you move mappings from EPT to SEPT?
Mostly correct, TDX move mapping from EPT to SEPT after LOCKED and
right before RUN.
So personally I prefer no host mapping for private MMIO.
Nah, cannot skip this step on AMD. Thanks,
Not sure if we are on the same page.
With the above explanation, we are.
I assume from HW perspective, host
CR3 mapping is not necessary for NPT/RMP build?
Yeah, the hw does not require that afaik. But the existing code
continues working for AMD, and I am guessing it is still true for your
case too, right? Unless the host userspace tries accessing the private
MMIO and some horrible stuff happens? Thanks,
Thanks,
Yilun
Thanks,
Yilun
page state tracking.
The MMIO KVM memory slot is still marked as shared as the guest can
access it as private or shared so marking the MMIO slot as private
is not going to help.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 928cf84778b0..e74f5c3d0821 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4366,7 +4366,11 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
{
bool async;
- if (fault->is_private)
+ if (fault->slot && fault->is_private && !kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot) &&
+ (vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM))
+ pr_warn("%s: private SEV TIO MMIO fault for fault->gfn=%llx\n",
+ __func__, fault->gfn);
+ else if (fault->is_private)
return kvm_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);
async = false;
--
2.45.2
--
Alexey
--
Alexey
