On Sun, May 30, 2010 at 04:01:53PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote: > On 05/30/2010 03:49 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >> On Sun, May 30, 2010 at 03:27:05PM +0300, Avi Kivity wrote: >> >>> On 05/30/2010 03:19 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, May 28, 2010 at 04:07:38PM -0700, Tom Lyon wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> The VFIO "driver" is used to allow privileged AND non-privileged processes to >>>>> implement user-level device drivers for any well-behaved PCI, PCI-X, and PCIe >>>>> devices. >>>>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lyon<pugs@xxxxxxxxx> >>>>> --- >>>>> This patch is the evolution of code which was first proposed as a patch to >>>>> uio/uio_pci_generic, then as a more generic uio patch. Now it is taken entirely >>>>> out of the uio framework, and things seem much cleaner. Of course, there is >>>>> a lot of functional overlap with uio, but the previous version just seemed >>>>> like a giant mode switch in the uio code that did not lead to clarity for >>>>> either the new or old code. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> IMO this was because this driver does two things: programming iommu and >>>> handling interrupts. uio does interrupt handling. >>>> We could have moved iommu / DMA programming to >>>> a separate driver, and have uio work with it. >>>> This would solve limitation of the current driver >>>> that is needs an iommu domain per device. >>>> >>>> >>> How do we enforce security then? We need to ensure that unprivileged >>> users can only use the device with an iommu. >>> >> Force assigning to iommu before we allow any other operation? >> > > That means the driver must be aware of the iommu. The userspace driver? Yes. And It is a good thing to be explicit there anyway, since this lets userspace map a non-contigious virtual address list into a contiguous bus address range. > -- > error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
