Re: [PATCH v4 05/15] arm64: Mark all I/O as non-secure shared

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Hi Suzuki,

On 7/30/24 8:36 PM, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
On 30/07/2024 02:36, Gavin Shan wrote:
On 7/1/24 7:54 PM, Steven Price wrote:
I'm unable to understand this. Steven, could you please explain a bit how
PROT_NS_SHARED is turned to a shared (non-secure) mapping to hardware?
According to tf-rmm's implementation in tf-rmm/lib/s2tt/src/s2tt_pvt_defs.h,
a shared (non-secure) mapping is is identified by NS bit (bit#55). I find
difficulties how the NS bit is correlate with PROT_NS_SHARED. For example,
how the NS bit is set based on PROT_NS_SHARED.


There are two things at play here :

1. Stage1 mapping controlled by the Realm (Linux in this case, as above).
2. Stage2 mapping controlled by the RMM (with RMI commands from NS Host).

Also :
The Realm's IPA space is divided into two halves (decided by the IPA Width of the Realm, not the NSbit #55), protected (Lower half) and
Unprotected (Upper half). All stage2 mappings of the "Unprotected IPA"
will have the NS bit (#55) set by the RMM. By design, any MMIO access
to an unprotected half is sent to the NS Host by RMM and any page
the Realm wants to share with the Host must be in the Upper half
of the IPA.

What we do above is controlling the "Stage1" used by the Linux. i.e,
for a given VA, we flip the Guest "PA" (in reality IPA) to the
"Unprotected" alias.

e.g., DTB describes a UART at address 0x10_0000 to Realm (with an IPA width of 40, like in the normal VM case), emulated by the host. Realm is
trying to map this I/O address into Stage1 at VA. So we apply the
BIT(39) as PROT_NS_SHARED while creating the Stage1 mapping.

ie., VA == stage1 ==> BIT(39) | 0x10_0000 =(IPA)== > 0x80_10_0000

                                                     0x8000_10_0000

Now, the Stage2 mapping won't be present for this IPA if it is emulated
and thus an access to "VA" causes a Stage2 Abort to the Host, which the
RMM allows the host to emulate. Otherwise a shared page would have been
mapped by the Host (and NS bit set at Stage2 by RMM), allowing the
data to be shared with the host.


Thank you for the explanation and details. It really helps to understand
how the access fault to the unprotected space (upper half) is routed to NS
host, and then VMM (QEMU) for emulation. If the commit log can be improved
with those information, it will make reader easier to understand the code.

I had the following call trace and it seems the address 0x8000_10_1000 is
converted to 0x10_0000 in [1], based on current code base (branch: cca-full/v3).
At [1], the GPA is masked with kvm_gpa_stolen_bits() so that BIT#39 is removed
in this particular case.

  kvm_vcpu_ioctl(KVM_RUN)                         // non-secured host
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run
  kvm_rec_enter
  rmi_rec_enter                                   // -> SMC_RMI_REC_ENTER
    :
  rmm_handler                                     // tf-rmm
  handle_ns_smc
  smc_rec_enter
  rec_run_loop
  run_realm
    :
  el2_vectors
  el2_sync_lel
  realm_exit
    :
  handle_realm_exit
  handle_exception_sync
  handle_data_abort
    :
  handle_rme_exit                                 // non-secured host
  rec_exit_sync_dabt
  kvm_handle_guest_abort                          // -> [1]
  gfn_to_memslot
  io_mem_abort
  kvm_io_bus_write                                // -> run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO

Another question is how the Granule Protection Check (GPC) table is updated so
that the corresponding granule (0x8000_10_1000) to is accessible by NS host? I
mean how the BIT#39 is synchronized to GPC table and translated to the property
"granule is accessible by NS host".
Thanks,
Gavin









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