RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PATCH] vdpa: Add support for no-IOMMU mode

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



> On Thu, May 30, 2024 at 03:48:23PM +0530, Srujana Challa wrote:
> > This commit introduces support for an UNSAFE, no-IOMMU mode in the
> > vhost-vdpa driver. When enabled, this mode provides no device
> > isolation, no DMA translation, no host kernel protection, and cannot
> > be used for device assignment to virtual machines. It requires RAWIO
> > permissions and will taint the kernel.
> > This mode requires enabling the
> "enable_vhost_vdpa_unsafe_noiommu_mode"
> > option on the vhost-vdpa driver. This mode would be useful to get
> > better performance on specifice low end machines and can be leveraged
> > by embedded platforms where applications run in controlled environment.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Srujana Challa <schalla@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Thought hard about that.
> I think given vfio supports this, we can do that too, and the extension is small.
> 
> However, it looks like setting this parameter will automatically change the
> behaviour for existing userspace when IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY is set.
> 
> I suggest a new domain type for use just for this purpose.  This way if host has
> an iommu, then the same kernel can run both VMs with isolation and unsafe
> embedded apps without.
Could you provide further details on this concept? What criteria would determine
the configuration of the new domain type? Would this require a boot parameter
similar to IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY, such as iommu.passthrough=1 or iommu.pt?
> 
> > ---
> >  drivers/vhost/vdpa.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c b/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c index
> > bc4a51e4638b..d071c30125aa 100644
> > --- a/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c
> > +++ b/drivers/vhost/vdpa.c
> > @@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ enum {
> >
> >  #define VHOST_VDPA_IOTLB_BUCKETS 16
> >
> > +bool vhost_vdpa_noiommu;
> > +module_param_named(enable_vhost_vdpa_unsafe_noiommu_mode,
> > +		   vhost_vdpa_noiommu, bool, 0644);
> > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enable_vhost_vdpa_unsafe_noiommu_mode,
> "Enable
> > +UNSAFE, no-IOMMU mode.  This mode provides no device isolation, no
> > +DMA translation, no host kernel protection, cannot be used for device
> > +assignment to virtual machines, requires RAWIO permissions, and will
> > +taint the kernel.  If you do not know what this is for, step away.
> > +(default: false)");
> > +
> >  struct vhost_vdpa_as {
> >  	struct hlist_node hash_link;
> >  	struct vhost_iotlb iotlb;
> > @@ -60,6 +65,7 @@ struct vhost_vdpa {
> >  	struct vdpa_iova_range range;
> >  	u32 batch_asid;
> >  	bool suspended;
> > +	bool noiommu_en;
> >  };
> >
> >  static DEFINE_IDA(vhost_vdpa_ida);
> > @@ -887,6 +893,10 @@ static void vhost_vdpa_general_unmap(struct
> > vhost_vdpa *v,  {
> >  	struct vdpa_device *vdpa = v->vdpa;
> >  	const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
> > +
> > +	if (v->noiommu_en)
> > +		return;
> > +
> >  	if (ops->dma_map) {
> >  		ops->dma_unmap(vdpa, asid, map->start, map->size);
> >  	} else if (ops->set_map == NULL) {
> > @@ -980,6 +990,9 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v,
> struct vhost_iotlb *iotlb,
> >  	if (r)
> >  		return r;
> >
> > +	if (v->noiommu_en)
> > +		goto skip_map;
> > +
> >  	if (ops->dma_map) {
> >  		r = ops->dma_map(vdpa, asid, iova, size, pa, perm, opaque);
> >  	} else if (ops->set_map) {
> > @@ -995,6 +1008,7 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v,
> struct vhost_iotlb *iotlb,
> >  		return r;
> >  	}
> >
> > +skip_map:
> >  	if (!vdpa->use_va)
> >  		atomic64_add(PFN_DOWN(size), &dev->mm->pinned_vm);
> >
> > @@ -1298,6 +1312,7 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_alloc_domain(struct
> vhost_vdpa *v)
> >  	struct vdpa_device *vdpa = v->vdpa;
> >  	const struct vdpa_config_ops *ops = vdpa->config;
> >  	struct device *dma_dev = vdpa_get_dma_dev(vdpa);
> > +	struct iommu_domain *domain;
> >  	const struct bus_type *bus;
> >  	int ret;
> >
> > @@ -1305,6 +1320,14 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_alloc_domain(struct
> vhost_vdpa *v)
> >  	if (ops->set_map || ops->dma_map)
> >  		return 0;
> >
> > +	domain = iommu_get_domain_for_dev(dma_dev);
> > +	if ((!domain || domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_IDENTITY) &&
> > +	    vhost_vdpa_noiommu && capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
> 
> So if userspace does not have CAP_SYS_RAWIO instead of failing with a
> permission error the functionality changes silently?
> That's confusing, I think.
Yes, you are correct. I will modify the code to return error when vhost_vdpa_noiommu
is set and CAP_SYS_RAWIO is not set.

Thanks.
> 
> 
> > +		add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
> > +		dev_warn(&v->dev, "Adding kernel taint for noiommu on
> device\n");
> > +		v->noiommu_en = true;
> > +		return 0;
> > +	}
> >  	bus = dma_dev->bus;
> >  	if (!bus)
> >  		return -EFAULT;
> > --
> > 2.25.1





[Index of Archives]     [KVM ARM]     [KVM ia64]     [KVM ppc]     [Virtualization Tools]     [Spice Development]     [Libvirt]     [Libvirt Users]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite Questions]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]     [XFree86]

  Powered by Linux