On Wed, 2024-07-10 at 10:49 +0100, Patrick Roy wrote: > On 7/9/24 15:36, David Woodhouse wrote: I did? It isn't September yet, surely? > > On Tue, 2024-07-09 at 14:20 +0100, Patrick Roy wrote: > > > KVM uses gfn_to_pfn_caches to cache translations from gfn all the way to > > > the pfn (for example, kvm-clock caches the page storing the page used > > > for guest/host communication this way). Unlike the gfn_to_hva_cache, > > > where no equivalent caching semantics were possible to gmem-backed gfns > > > (see also 858e8068a750 ("kvm: pfncache: enlighten about gmem")), here it > > > is possible to simply cache the pfn returned by `kvm_gmem_get_pfn`. > > > > > > Additionally, gfn_to_pfn_caches now invalidate whenever a cached gfn's > > > attributes are flipped from shared to private (or vice-versa). > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Patrick Roy <roypat@xxxxxxxxxxxx> > > > > I can't see how this is safe from race conditions. > > > > When the GPC is invalidated from gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start() > > its *write* lock is taken and gpc->valid is set to false. > > > > In parallel, any code using the GPC to access guest memory will take > > the *read* lock, call kvm_gpc_check(), and then go ahead and use the > > pointer to its heart's content until eventually dropping the read lock. > > > > Since invalidation takes the write lock, it has to wait until the GPC > > is no longer in active use, and the pointer cannot be being > > dereferenced. > > > > How does this work for the kvm_mem_is_private() check. You've added a > > check in kvm_gpc_check(), but what if the pfn is made private > > immediately *after* that check? Unless the code path which makes the > > pfn private also takes the write lock, how is it safe? > > Ah, you're right - I did in fact overlook this. I do think that it works > out though: kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes, which is used for flipping > between shared/private, registers the range which had its attributes > changed for invalidation, and thus gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start > should get called for it (although I have to admit I do not immediately > see what the exact callstack for this looks like, so maybe I am > misunderstanding something about invalidation here?). In that case, wouldn't that mean the explicit checks on gpc->is_private matching kvm_mem_is_private() would be redundant and you can remove them because you can trust that gpc->valid would be cleared?
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