RE: [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when RSB filling is required

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Amit Shah <amit@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, July 1, 2024 7:52 AM
> To: Jim Mattson <jmattson@xxxxxxxxxx>; Sean Christopherson
> <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx; x86@xxxxxxxxxx; kvm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; linux-
> kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; mingo@xxxxxxxxxx;
> bp@xxxxxxxxx; dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; hpa@xxxxxxxxx; Phillips, Kim
> <kim.phillips@xxxxxxx>; Kaplan, David <David.Kaplan@xxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KVM: SVM: let alternatives handle the cases when
> RSB filling is required
>
> Caution: This message originated from an External Source. Use proper
> caution when opening attachments, clicking links, or responding.
>
>
> On Fri, 2024-06-28 at 11:48 -0700, Jim Mattson wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 28, 2024 at 9:09 AM Sean Christopherson
> > <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jun 26, 2024, Amit Shah wrote:
> > > > ---
> > > >  arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 8 ++------
> > > >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> > > > b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S index a0c8eb37d3e1..2ed80aea3bb1
> > > > 100644
> > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
> > > > @@ -209,10 +209,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
> > > >  7:   vmload %_ASM_AX
> > > >  8:
> > > >
> > > > -#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
> > > >       /* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit,
> > > > before RET! */
> > > > -     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
> > > > X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
> > > > -#endif
> > > > +     FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
> > > > X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT
> > >
> > > Out of an abundance of paranoia, shouldn't this be?
> > >
> > >         FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_CX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS,
> > > X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT,\
> > >                            X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
> > >
> > > Hmm, but it looks like that would incorrectly trigger the "lite"
> > > flavor for
> > > families 0xf - 0x12.  I assume those old CPUs aren't affected by
> > > whatever on earth EIBRS_PBRSB is.
> > >
> > >         /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
> > >         VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
> > >         VULNWL_AMD(0x10,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
> > >         VULNWL_AMD(0x11,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
> > >         VULNWL_AMD(0x12,        NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_BHI),
> > >
> > >         /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches
> > > won't work */
> > >         VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,      NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO |
> NO_EIBRS_PBRSB |
> > > NO_BHI),
> > >         VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,    NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF |
> > > NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO |
> NO_EIBRS_PBRSB |
> > > NO_BHI),
> >
> > Your assumption is correct. As for why the cpu_vuln_whitelist[]
> > doesn't say so explicitly, you need to read between the lines...
> >
> > >        /*
> > >         * AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the
> > > Intel feature
> > >         * flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the
> > > whitelist.
> > >         *
> > >         * Don't use AutoIBRS when SNP is enabled because it degrades
> > > host
> > >         * userspace indirect branch performance.
> > >         */
> > >        if ((x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL) ||
> > >            (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS) &&
> > >             !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))) {
> > >                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
> > >                if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB)
> > > &&
> > >                    !(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
> > >                        setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
> > >        }
> >
> > Families 0FH through 12H don't have EIBRS or AutoIBRS, so there's no
> > cpu_vuln_whitelist[] lookup. Hence, no need to set the NO_EIBRS_PBRSB
> > bit, even if it is accurate.
>
> The commit that adds the RSB_VMEXIT_LITE feature flag does describe the
> bug in a good amount of detail:
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i
> d=2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3
>
> I've not seen any indication this is required for AMD CPUs.
>
> David, do you agree we don't need this?
>

It's not required, as AMD CPUs don't have the PBRSB issue with AutoIBRS.  Although I think Sean was talking about being extra paranoid

--David Kaplan




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