On 2024/4/25 20:58, Alex Williamson wrote:
On Thu, 25 Apr 2024 17:26:54 +0800
Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 2024/4/25 02:24, Alex Williamson wrote:
On Tue, 23 Apr 2024 21:12:21 -0300
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 11:47:50PM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2024 8:02 PM
On Tue, Apr 23, 2024 at 07:43:27AM +0000, Tian, Kevin wrote:
I'm not sure how userspace can fully handle this w/o certain assistance
from the kernel.
So I kind of agree that emulated PASID capability is probably the only
contract which the kernel should provide:
- mapped 1:1 at the physical location, or
- constructed at an offset according to DVSEC, or
- constructed at an offset according to a look-up table
The VMM always scans the vfio pci config space to expose vPASID.
Then the remaining open is what VMM could do when a VF supports
PASID but unfortunately it's not reported by vfio. W/o the capability
of inspecting the PASID state of PF, probably the only feasible option
is to maintain a look-up table in VMM itself and assumes the kernel
always enables the PASID cap on PF.
I'm still not sure I like doing this in the kernel - we need to do the
same sort of thing for ATS too, right?
VF is allowed to implement ATS.
PRI has the same problem as PASID.
I'm surprised by this, I would have guessed ATS would be the device
global one, PRI not being per-VF seems problematic??? How do you
disable PRI generation to get a clean shutdown?
It feels simpler if the indicates if PASID and ATS can be supported
and userspace builds the capability blocks.
this routes back to Alex's original question about using different
interfaces (a device feature vs. PCI PASID cap) for VF and PF.
I'm not sure it is different interfaces..
The only reason to pass the PF's PASID cap is to give free space to
the VMM. If we are saying that gaps are free space (excluding a list
of bad devices) then we don't acutally need to do that anymore.
Are we saying that now?? That's new.
VMM will always create a synthetic PASID cap and kernel will always
suppress a real one.
An iommufd query will indicate if the vIOMMU can support vPASID on
that device.
Same for all the troublesome non-physical caps.
There are migration considerations too - the blocks need to be
migrated over and end up in the same place as well..
Can you elaborate what is the problem with the kernel emulating
the PASID cap in this consideration?
If the kernel changes the algorithm, say it wants to do PASID, PRI,
something_new then it might change the layout
We can't just have the kernel decide without also providing a way for
userspace to say what the right layout actually is. :\
The capability layout is only relevant to migration, right? A variant
driver that supports migration is a prerequisite and would also be
responsible for exposing the PASID capability. This isn't as disjoint
as it's being portrayed.
Does it talk about a case where the devices between src/dest are
different versions (but backward compatible) with different unused
space layout and the kernel approach may pick up different offsets
while the VMM can guarantee the same offset?
That is also a concern where the PCI cap layout may change a bit but
they are still migration compatible, but my bigger worry is that the
kernel just lays out the fake caps in a different way because the
kernel changes.
Outside of migration, what does it matter if the cap layout is
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
different? A driver should never hard code the address for a
capability.
But it may store the offset of capability to make next cap access more
convenient. I noticted struct pci_dev stores the offset of PRI and PASID
cap. So if the layout of config space changed between src and dst, it may
result in problem in guest when guest driver uses the offsets to access
PRI/PASID cap. I can see pci_dev stores offsets of other caps (acs, msi,
msix). So there is already a problem even put aside the PRI and PASID cap.
Yes, I had noted "outside of migration" above. Config space must be
consistent to a running VM. But the possibility of config space
changing like this only exists in the case where the driver supports
migration, so I think we're inventing an unrealistic concern that a
driver that supports migration would arbitrarily modify the config space
layout in order to make an argument for VMM managed layout. Thanks,
I was considering a case in which the src VM has a v1 hw device, while the
dst VM has a v2 hw device. Due to whatever reasons, the config space
layouts are different between v1 and v2 hw. Since the current vfio copies
the physical layout (except for the hidden caps) to VMM, the layout between
the src and dst VM would be different. This would result in problem since
the cap offsets are stale. It seems to be a problem you mentioned in
another email of this thread[1]. :)
[1] "So in either case, the problem might be more along the
lines of how to make a V1 device from a V2 driver, which is more the
device type/flavor/persona problem.
"
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/20240424141349.376bdbf9.alex.williamson@xxxxxxxxxx/
Alex
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_PRI
u16 pri_cap; /* PRI Capability offset */
u32 pri_reqs_alloc; /* Number of PRI requests allocated */
unsigned int pasid_required:1; /* PRG Response PASID Required */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_PASID
u16 pasid_cap; /* PASID Capability offset */
u16 pasid_features;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_P2PDMA
struct pci_p2pdma __rcu *p2pdma;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_DOE
struct xarray doe_mbs; /* Data Object Exchange mailboxes */
#endif
u16 acs_cap; /* ACS Capability offset */
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/include/linux/pci.h#L350
At least if the VMM is doing this then the VMM can include the
information in its migration scheme and use it to recreate the PCI
layout withotu having to create a bunch of uAPI to do so.
We're again back to migration compatibility, where again the capability
layout would be governed by the migration support in the in-kernel
variant driver. Once migration is involved the location of a PASID
shouldn't be arbitrary, whether it's provided by the kernel or the VMM.
Regardless, the VMM ultimately has the authority what the guest
sees in config space. The VMM is not bound to expose the PASID at the
offset provided by the kernel, or bound to expose it at all. The
kernel exposed PASID can simply provide an available location and set
of enabled capabilities. Thanks,
Alex
--
Regards,
Yi Liu
