On Wed, 12 May 2010 18:29:57 -0700
Chris Wright <chrisw@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The PCI config space bin_attr read handler has a hardcoded CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> check to verify privileges before allowing a user to read device
> dependent config space. This is meant to protect from an unprivileged
> user potentially locking up the box.
Or hacking it. You could argue the correct requirement is to change it to
require CAP_SYS_RAWIO in fact !
> With this patch the sysfs file owner is also considered privileged enough
> to read all of the config space.
Which breaks the main reason the check was there in the first place. To
stop accidents of the form
find / -exec grep {} "wibble"
blowing up in people's faces.
I agree with the problem - but IMHO the fix is to require opening the file
checks CAP_SYS_something instead: not to hack the read method and make it
even weirder and more un-Linux than it is now.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe kvm" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
