On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 11:34 AM Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > So you mean we can't set ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO for the guest because we don't know > if the guest will run the (other) existing mitigations which are believed to > suffice to mitigate BHI? > > The problem is that we can end up with a guest running extra BHI mitigations > while this is not needed. Could we inform the guest that eIBRS is not available > on the system so a Linux guest doesn't run with extra BHI mitigations? The (Linux or otherwise) guest will make its own determinations as to whether BHI mitigations are necessary. If the guest uses eIBRS, it will run with mitigations. If you hide bit 1 of MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES from the guest, it may decide to disable it. But if the guest decides to use eIBRS, I think it should use mitigations even if the host doesn't. It's a different story if the host isn't susceptible altogether. The ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO bit *can* be set if the processor doesn't have the bug at all, which would be true if cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_BHI). I would apply a patch to do that. Paolo
