On Fri, Mar 08, 2024, Yan Zhao wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 06:41:32PM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > @@ -320,6 +328,11 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
> > else
> > r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
> >
> > + if (r == RET_PF_EMULATE && fault.is_private) {
> Should we just check VM type + RET_PF_EMULATE, and abort?
No, the goal here is purely to ensure that emulation is never triggered for
private memory. Guarding against attempting emulation for a VM type that doesn't
support emulation at all is something different.
And more concretely, as of this commit, all VM types that support private memory
(i.e. SW_PROTECTED_VM) support emulation, just not for private memory.
> If r is RET_PF_EMULATE, and fault is caused by accesing a shared address,
> the emulation code could still meet error if guest page table pages are in
> private memory, right?
Yes, which is why I squeezed in a documentation update for v6.8 to make it super
clear that SW_PROTECTED_VM is a development vehicle, i.e. that trying to use it
to run a real VM is all but guaranteed to cause explosions.
