> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > index 408969ac1291..7807bdcd87e8 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c > @@ -5839,19 +5839,31 @@ int noinline kvm_mmu_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, u64 err > bool direct = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role.direct; > > /* > - * IMPLICIT_ACCESS is a KVM-defined flag used to correctly perform SMAP > - * checks when emulating instructions that triggers implicit access. > * WARN if hardware generates a fault with an error code that collides > - * with the KVM-defined value. Clear the flag and continue on, i.e. > - * don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a flag > - * that KVM doesn't know about. > + * with KVM-defined sythentic flags. Clear the flags and continue on, > + * i.e. don't terminate the VM, as KVM can't possibly be relying on a > + * flag that KVM doesn't know about. > */ > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS)) > - error_code &= ~PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS; > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(error_code & PFERR_SYNTHETIC_MASK)) > + error_code &= ~PFERR_SYNTHETIC_MASK; > Hmm.. I thought for TDX the caller -- handle_ept_violation() -- should explicitly set the PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS so that here the fault handler can figure out the fault is private. Now it seems the caller should never pass PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS, then ... > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa))) > return RET_PF_RETRY; > > + /* > + * Except for reserved faults (emulated MMIO is shared-only), set the > + * private flag for software-protected VMs based on the gfn's current > + * attributes, which are the source of truth for such VMs. Note, this > + * wrong for nested MMUs as the GPA is an L2 GPA, but KVM doesn't > + * currently supported nested virtualization (among many other things) > + * for software-protected VMs. > + */ > + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) && > + !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK) && > + vcpu->kvm->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM && > + kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(cr2_or_gpa))) > + error_code |= PFERR_PRIVATE_ACCESS; > + > ... I am wondering how we figure out whether a fault is private for TDX?
