Re: [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe

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On 10/16/23 15:27, Michael Roth wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> 
> Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly
> signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the
> RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page.
> 
> When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC
> backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP
> entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just
> SNP-Active VMs.
> 
> If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable
> translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP
> hardware, if an in-use page is 2mb aligned and software accesses any
> part of the associated 2mb region with a hupage, the CPU will
> incorrectly treat the entire 2mb region as in-use and signal a spurious
> RMP violation #PF.
> 
> The recommended is to not use the hugepage for the VMCB, VMSA or
> AVIC backing page for similar reasons. Add a generic allocator that will
> ensure that the page returns is not hugepage (2mb or 1gb) and is safe to

This is a bit confusing wording as we are not avoiding "using a
hugepage" but AFAIU, avoiding using a (4k) page that has a hugepage
aligned physical address, right?

> be used when SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the
> VMCB/VMSA pages of nested guests.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@xxxxxxxxxx> # for nested VMSA case
> Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@xxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> [mdr: squash in nested guest handling from Ashish]
> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
> ---

<snip>

> +
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	unsigned long pfn;
> +	struct page *p;
> +
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
> +		return alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Allocate an SNP safe page to workaround the SNP erratum where
> +	 * the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation  #PF if a
> +	 * hugepage (2mb or 1gb) collides with the RMP entry of VMCB, VMSA
> +	 * or AVIC backing page. The recommeded workaround is to not use the
> +	 * hugepage.

Same here "not use the hugepage"

> +	 *
> +	 * Allocate one extra page, use a page which is not 2mb aligned
> +	 * and free the other.

This makes more sense.

> +	 */
> +	p = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO, 1);
> +	if (!p)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	split_page(p, 1);

Yeah I think that's a sensible use of split_page(), as we don't have
support for forcefully non-aligned allocations or specific "page
coloring" in the page allocator.
So even with my wording concerns:

Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>

> +
> +	pfn = page_to_pfn(p);
> +	if (IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PTRS_PER_PMD))
> +		__free_page(p++);
> +	else
> +		__free_page(p + 1);
> +
> +	return p;
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 1e7fb1ea45f7..8e4ef0cd968a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
>  	int ret = -ENOMEM;
>  
>  	memset(sd, 0, sizeof(struct svm_cpu_data));
> -	sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
> +	sd->save_area = snp_safe_alloc_page(NULL);
>  	if (!sd->save_area)
>  		return ret;
>  
> @@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>  
>  	err = -ENOMEM;
> -	vmcb01_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +	vmcb01_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
>  	if (!vmcb01_page)
>  		goto out;
>  
> @@ -1434,7 +1434,7 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
>  		 * the encrypted register state of the guest.
>  		 */
> -		vmsa_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
> +		vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
>  		if (!vmsa_page)
>  			goto error_free_vmcb_page;
>  
> @@ -4876,6 +4876,16 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static void *svm_alloc_apic_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct page *page = snp_safe_alloc_page(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (!page)
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +	return page_address(page);
> +}
> +
>  static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>  	.name = KBUILD_MODNAME,
>  
> @@ -5007,6 +5017,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
>  
>  	.vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector = svm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector,
>  	.vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons = avic_vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons,
> +	.alloc_apic_backing_page = svm_alloc_apic_backing_page,
>  };
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index c13070d00910..b7b8bf73cbb9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
>  void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
>  void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
>  void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
> +struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  
>  /* vmenter.S */
>  




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