Re: [PATCH 15/34] KVM: Add KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD ioctl() for guest-specific backing memory

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On 11/6/2023 12:30 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>

Introduce an ioctl(), KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD, to allow creating file-based
memory that is tied to a specific KVM virtual machine and whose primary
purpose is to serve guest memory.

A guest-first memory subsystem allows for optimizations and enhancements
that are kludgy or outright infeasible to implement/support in a generic
memory subsystem.  With guest_memfd, guest protections and mapping sizes
are fully decoupled from host userspace mappings.   E.g. KVM currently
doesn't support mapping memory as writable in the guest without it also
being writable in host userspace, as KVM's ABI uses VMA protections to
define the allow guest protection.  Userspace can fudge this by
establishing two mappings, a writable mapping for the guest and readable
one for itself, but that’s suboptimal on multiple fronts.

Similarly, KVM currently requires the guest mapping size to be a strict
subset of the host userspace mapping size, e.g. KVM doesn’t support
creating a 1GiB guest mapping unless userspace also has a 1GiB guest
mapping.  Decoupling the mappings sizes would allow userspace to precisely
map only what is needed without impacting guest performance, e.g. to
harden against unintentional accesses to guest memory.

Decoupling guest and userspace mappings may also allow for a cleaner
alternative to high-granularity mappings for HugeTLB, which has reached a
bit of an impasse and is unlikely to ever be merged.

A guest-first memory subsystem also provides clearer line of sight to
things like a dedicated memory pool (for slice-of-hardware VMs) and
elimination of "struct page" (for offload setups where userspace _never_
needs to mmap() guest memory).

More immediately, being able to map memory into KVM guests without mapping
said memory into the host is critical for Confidential VMs (CoCo VMs), the
initial use case for guest_memfd.  While AMD's SEV and Intel's TDX prevent
untrusted software from reading guest private data by encrypting guest
memory with a key that isn't usable by the untrusted host, projects such
as Protected KVM (pKVM) provide confidentiality and integrity *without*
relying on memory encryption.  And with SEV-SNP and TDX, accessing guest
private memory can be fatal to the host, i.e. KVM must be prevent host
userspace from accessing guest memory irrespective of hardware behavior.

Attempt #1 to support CoCo VMs was to add a VMA flag to mark memory as
being mappable only by KVM (or a similarly enlightened kernel subsystem).
That approach was abandoned largely due to it needing to play games with
PROT_NONE to prevent userspace from accessing guest memory.

Attempt #2 to was to usurp PG_hwpoison to prevent the host from mapping
guest private memory into userspace, but that approach failed to meet
several requirements for software-based CoCo VMs, e.g. pKVM, as the kernel
wouldn't easily be able to enforce a 1:1 page:guest association, let alone
a 1:1 pfn:gfn mapping.  And using PG_hwpoison does not work for memory
that isn't backed by 'struct page', e.g. if devices gain support for
exposing encrypted memory regions to guests.

Attempt #3 was to extend the memfd() syscall and wrap shmem to provide
dedicated file-based guest memory.  That approach made it as far as v10
before feedback from Hugh Dickins and Christian Brauner (and others) led
to it demise.

Hugh's objection was that piggybacking shmem made no sense for KVM's use
case as KVM didn't actually *want* the features provided by shmem.  I.e.
KVM was using memfd() and shmem to avoid having to manage memory directly,
not because memfd() and shmem were the optimal solution, e.g. things like
read/write/mmap in shmem were dead weight.

Christian pointed out flaws with implementing a partial overlay (wrapping
only _some_ of shmem), e.g. poking at inode_operations or super_operations
would show shmem stuff, but address_space_operations and file_operations
would show KVM's overlay.  Paraphrashing heavily, Christian suggested KVM
stop being lazy and create a proper API.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20201020061859.18385-1-kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210416154106.23721-1-kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210824005248.200037-1-seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211111141352.26311-1-chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221202061347.1070246-1-chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ff5c5b97-acdf-9745-ebe5-c6609dd6322e@xxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230418-anfallen-irdisch-6993a61be10b@brauner
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZEM5Zq8oo+xnApW9@xxxxxxxxxx
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230306191944.GA15773@monkey
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/ZII1p8ZHlHaQ3dDl@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Maciej Szmigiero <mail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@xxxxxxx>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Quentin Perret <qperret@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Wang <wei.w.wang@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@xxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@xxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-17-seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
  Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst |  69 ++++-
  fs/anon_inodes.c               |   1 +
  include/linux/kvm_host.h       |  48 +++
  include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       |  15 +-
  virt/kvm/Kconfig               |   4 +
  virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm          |   1 +
  virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c         | 538 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  virt/kvm/kvm_main.c            |  59 +++-
  virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h              |  26 ++
  9 files changed, 754 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
  create mode 100644 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 083ed507e200..6d681f45969e 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -6202,6 +6202,15 @@ superset of the features supported by the system.
  :Parameters: struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 (in)
  :Returns: 0 on success, -1 on error
+KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 is an extension to KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION that
+allows mapping guest_memfd memory into a guest.  All fields shared with
+KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION identically.  Userspace can set KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD
+in flags to have KVM bind the memory region to a given guest_memfd range of
+[guest_memfd_offset, guest_memfd_offset + memory_size].  The target guest_memfd
+must point at a file created via KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD on the current VM, and
+the target range must not be bound to any other memory region.  All standard
+bounds checks apply (use common sense).
+
  ::
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2 {
@@ -6210,9 +6219,24 @@ superset of the features supported by the system.
  	__u64 guest_phys_addr;
  	__u64 memory_size; /* bytes */
  	__u64 userspace_addr; /* start of the userspace allocated memory */
+	__u64 guest_memfd_offset;
+	__u32 guest_memfd;
+	__u32 pad1;
+	__u64 pad2[14];
    };
-See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION.
+A KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD region _must_ have a valid guest_memfd (private memory) and
+userspace_addr (shared memory).  However, "valid" for userspace_addr simply
+means that the address itself must be a legal userspace address.  The backing
+mapping for userspace_addr is not required to be valid/populated at the time of
+KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2, e.g. shared memory can be lazily mapped/allocated
+on-demand.
+
+When mapping a gfn into the guest, KVM selects shared vs. private, i.e consumes
+userspace_addr vs. guest_memfd, based on the gfn's KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE
+state.  At VM creation time, all memory is shared, i.e. the PRIVATE attribute
+is '0' for all gfns.  Userspace can control whether memory is shared/private by
+toggling KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE via KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES as needed.
4.141 KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
  -------------------------------
@@ -6250,6 +6274,49 @@ the state of a gfn/page as needed.
The "flags" field is reserved for future extensions and must be '0'. +4.142 KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD
+----------------------------
+
+:Capability: KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD
+:Architectures: none
+:Type: vm ioctl
+:Parameters: struct kvm_create_guest_memfd(in)
+:Returns: 0 on success, <0 on error
+
+KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor
+that refers to it.  guest_memfd files are roughly analogous to files created
+via memfd_create(), e.g. guest_memfd files live in RAM, have volatile storage,
+and are automatically released when the last reference is dropped.  Unlike
+"regular" memfd_create() files, guest_memfd files are bound to their owning
+virtual machine (see below), cannot be mapped, read, or written by userspace,
+and cannot be resized  (guest_memfd files do however support PUNCH_HOLE).
+
+::
+
+  struct kvm_create_guest_memfd {
+	__u64 size;
+	__u64 flags;
+	__u64 reserved[6];
+  };
+
+Conceptually, the inode backing a guest_memfd file represents physical memory,
+i.e. is coupled to the virtual machine as a thing, not to a "struct kvm".  The
+file itself, which is bound to a "struct kvm", is that instance's view of the
+underlying memory, e.g. effectively provides the translation of guest addresses
+to host memory.  This allows for use cases where multiple KVM structures are
+used to manage a single virtual machine, e.g. when performing intrahost
+migration of a virtual machine.
+
+KVM currently only supports mapping guest_memfd via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2,
+and more specifically via the guest_memfd and guest_memfd_offset fields in
+"struct kvm_userspace_memory_region2", where guest_memfd_offset is the offset
+into the guest_memfd instance.  For a given guest_memfd file, there can be at
+most one mapping per page, i.e. binding multiple memory regions to a single
+guest_memfd range is not allowed (any number of memory regions can be bound to
+a single guest_memfd file, but the bound ranges must not overlap).
+
+See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for additional details.
+
  5. The kvm_run structure
  ========================
diff --git a/fs/anon_inodes.c b/fs/anon_inodes.c
index 3d4a27f8b4fe..6f3d31b4d1e3 100644
--- a/fs/anon_inodes.c
+++ b/fs/anon_inodes.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ struct file *anon_inode_create_getfile(const char *name,
  	return __anon_inode_getfile(name, fops, priv, flags,
  				    context_inode, true);
  }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(anon_inode_create_getfile);
static int __anon_inode_getfd(const char *name,
  			      const struct file_operations *fops,
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 68a144cb7dbc..a6de526c0426 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -589,8 +589,20 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {
  	u32 flags;
  	short id;
  	u16 as_id;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+	struct {
+		struct file __rcu *file;
+		pgoff_t pgoff;
+	} gmem;
+#endif
  };
+static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD);
+}
+

maybe we can move this block and ...

<snip>

@@ -2355,6 +2379,30 @@ bool kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
  					struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
  bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
  					 struct kvm_gfn_range *range);
+
+static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) &&
+	       kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return false;
+}
  #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */

this block to Patch 18?


<snip>

@@ -4844,6 +4875,10 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)
  #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
  	case KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES:
  		return kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+	case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD:
+		return !kvm || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm);
  #endif
  	default:
  		break;
@@ -5277,6 +5312,18 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
  	case KVM_GET_STATS_FD:
  		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(kvm);
  		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+	case KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD: {
+		struct kvm_create_guest_memfd guest_memfd;

Do we need a guard of below?

		r = -EINVAL;
		if (!kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm))
			goto out;



+		r = -EFAULT;
+		if (copy_from_user(&guest_memfd, argp, sizeof(guest_memfd)))
+			goto out;
+
+		r = kvm_gmem_create(kvm, &guest_memfd);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
  	default:
  		r = kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
  	}
@@ -6409,6 +6456,8 @@ int kvm_init(unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align, struct module *module)
  	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(r))
  		goto err_vfio;
+ kvm_gmem_init(module);
+
  	/*
  	 * Registration _must_ be the very last thing done, as this exposes
  	 * /dev/kvm to userspace, i.e. all infrastructure must be setup!
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
index 180f1a09e6ba..ecefc7ec51af 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
@@ -37,4 +37,30 @@ static inline void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm,
  }
  #endif /* HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module);
+int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args);
+int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+		  unsigned int fd, loff_t offset);
+void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot);
+#else
+static inline void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module)
+{
+
+}
+
+static inline int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm,
+					 struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					 unsigned int fd, loff_t offset)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+	return -EIO;
+}
+
+static inline void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */
+
  #endif /* __KVM_MM_H__ */





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