On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 8/22/23 10:14, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 22, 2023, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> > > On 8/10/23 18:49, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > Fix a bug where KVM injects a bogus #UD for SEV guests when trying to skip
> > > > an INT3 as part of re-injecting the associated #BP that got kinda sorta
> > > > intercepted due to a #NPF occuring while vectoring/delivering the #BP.
> > > >
> > > > I haven't actually confirmed that patch 1 fixes the bug, as it's a
> > > > different change than what I originally proposed. I'm 99% certain it will
> > > > work, but I definitely need verification that it fixes the problem
> > > >
> > > > Patch 2 is a tangentially related cleanup to make NRIPS a requirement for
> > > > enabling SEV, e.g. so that we don't ever get "bug" reports of SEV guests
> > > > not working when NRIPS is disabled.
> > > >
> > > > Sean Christopherson (2):
> > > > KVM: SVM: Don't inject #UD if KVM attempts emulation of SEV guest w/o
> > > > insn
> > > > KVM: SVM: Require nrips support for SEV guests (and beyond)
> > > >
> > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +-
> > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
> > > > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> > > > 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > We ran some stress tests against a version of the kernel without this fix
> > > and we're able to reproduce the issue, but not reliably, after a few hours.
> > > With this patch, it has not reproduced after running for a week.
> > >
> > > Not as reliable a scenario as the original reporter, but this looks like it
> > > resolves the issue.
> >
> > Thanks Tom! I'll apply this for v6.6, that'll give us plenty of time to change
> > course if necessary.
>
> I may have spoke to soon... When the #UD was triggered it was here:
>
> [ 0.118524] Spectre V2 : Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls
> [ 0.118524] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
> [ 0.118524] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl
> [ 0.118524] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
> [ 0.118524] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.2.2-amdsos-build50-ubuntu-20.04+ #1
> [ 0.118524] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
> [ 0.118524] RIP: 0010:int3_selftest_ip+0x0/0x60
> [ 0.118524] Code: b9 25 05 00 00 48 c7 c2 e8 7c 80 b0 48 c7 c6 fe 1c d3 b0 48 c7 c7 f0 7d da b0 e8 4c 2c 0b ff e8 75 da 15 ff 0f 0b 48 8d 7d f4 <cc> 90 90 90 90 83 7d f4 01 74 2f 80 3d 39 7f a8 00 00 74 24 b9 34
>
>
> Now (after about a week) we've encountered a hang here:
>
> [ 0.106216] Spectre V2 : Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls
> [ 0.106216] Spectre V2 : mitigation: Enabling conditional Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
> [ 0.106216] Speculative Store Bypass: Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl
>
> It is in the very same spot and so I wonder if the return false (without
> queuing a #UD) is causing an infinite loop here that appears as a guest
> hang. Whereas, we have some systems running the first patch that you
> created that have not hit this hang.
>
> But I'm not sure why or how this patch could cause the guest hang. I
> would think that the retry of the instruction would resolve everything
> and the guest would continue. Unfortunately, the guest was killed, so I'll
> try to reproduce and get a dump or trace points of the VM to see what is
> going on.
Gah, it's because x86_emulate_instruction() returns '1' and not '0' when
svm_can_emulate_instruction() returns false. svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip()
would then continue with the injection, i.e. inject #BP on the INT3 RIP, not on
the RIP following the INT3, which would cause this check to fail
if (regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE != selftest)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
and eventually send do_trap_no_signal() to die().
I distinctly remember seeing the return value problem when writing the patch, but
missed that it would result in KVM injecting the unexpected #BP.
I punted on trying to properly fix this by having can_emulate_instruction()
differentiate between "retry insn" and "inject exception", because that change
is painfully invasive and I though I could get away with the simple fix. Drat.
I think the best option is to add a "temporary" patch so that the fix for @stable
is short, sweet, and safe, and then do the can_emulate_instruction() cleanup that
I was avoiding.
E.g. this as patch 2/4 (or maybe 2/5) of this series:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7cb5ef5835c2..8457a36b44c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
svm->vmcb->control.int_state |= SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK;
}
+static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type,
+ void *insn, int insn_len);
static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
bool commit_side_effects)
@@ -384,6 +386,14 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
if (!svm->next_rip) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Drop this when kvm_emulate_instruction() does the
+ * right thing and treats "can't emulate" as outright failure
+ * for EMULTYPE_SKIP.
+ */
+ if (!svm_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, NULL, 0))
+ return 0;
+
if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects))
old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags;
